Models of Labour Enforcement: Necessary Indeterminacy

Abstract

Labour laws are enforced in many different ways. Sometimes public agencies enforce the laws and sometimes workers are authorized to do so. Sometimes employer/violators pay for litigation costs and sometimes not. Sometimes the sanctions for violations are set by the harm caused (such as loss of back pay) and sometimes the sanctions are fines and penalties. Sometimes agencies are the primary forums for hearing disputes and sometimes courts (Summers 1992). The consequences of these types of differences in labour enforcement are under-studied empirically. Labour enforcement theory, if anything, is even less well-studied. This is unfortunate, in part, because only a well-developed theory can help policy-makers sort through the many choices available when they are deciding how to enforce a labour statute. Moreover, a well-developed theory is necessary to guide researchers in their efforts. A theoretical model is needed to simplify the world sufficiently to permit testable hypotheses.