Abstract
Since the Penn Central decision in 1978, there have been occasional indications that the economic liberties of the constitution might be given a new life. But through it all, the now ageless question of whether a regulation of private property has gone too far has remained the defining issue in property rights jurisprudence. Without a marker to determine when a regulation has gone too far, there is nothing left but “sifting facts and weighing circumstances,”1 all in service to the Penn Central balancing test.
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Notes
See, e.g., Michael C. Blumm & Lucas Ritchie, Lucas’s Unlikely Legacy: The Rise of Background Principles as Categorical Takings Defenses, 29 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 321, 367 (2005)
J.B. Ruhl, Making Nuisance Ecological, 58 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 753, 759 (2008).
For in-depth explanations of the historic and theoretical errors in the arguments of Ruhl, Blumm and Ritchie, see James L. Huffman, Background Principles and the Rule of Law: Fifteen Years after Lucas, 35 Ecology L.Q. 1 (2008).
James L. Huffman, Beware of Greens in Praise of the Common Law, 58 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 813 (2008).
Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 542 (2005). Justice O’Connor is here quoting Chevron’s brief, which is in turn quoting Armstongv. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
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© 2013 James L. Huffman
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Huffman, J.L. (2013). Unconstitutional Takings of Private Property. In: Private Property and the Constitution. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137376732_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137376732_6
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, New York
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