Abstract
The reasons for the strange death — or decline — of causality in history are various, resting in part on reactions to the illegitimate importing of natural-scientific methods in the 1950s and 60s and in part on a longstanding ‘empirical’ attachment to evidence, chronology, facts, events, description, objectivity and narrative.1 Above all, the marginalization of causal explanation in theories of history has been connected to a series of oft-decried but rarely completed ‘turns’ — linguistic, semiotic, symbolic, cultural, post-colonial — in specific historical sub-disciplines during the last two decades or so.2 The concomitant disputes have been acrimonious, with Patrick Joyce accusing his antagonist Lawrence Stone of issuing ‘a war cry’ and ‘pre-emptive strike on “postmodernism”’ in 1991, after the latter had blamed three ‘threats’ from linguistics, cultural and symbolic anthropology, and ‘new historicism’ for provoking ‘a crisis of self-confidence’ within the discipline of history. Generally, the different positions have been cast as a defence of — or attack on — the ability of historians to describe the world beyond texts and to use evidence to prove or disprove a case, rather than implying a direct assault on causality.3 ‘Derrida has concentrated his fire upon the realist assumptions embedded in the Western conviction that words could repeat reality’, wrote the intellectual historian Joyce Appleby in 1998: ‘Despite the overt commitment to rationality, writings in the Western tradition, he has said, can always be found undermining these categories [of dichotomy] because they were not, in actuality, opposites that explained the world but elements within a hermeneutic system’.4
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Notes
For a good recent analysis, see J. W. Cook et al. (eds), The Cultural Turn in U.S. History: Past, Present and Future (Chicago, 2009). Although it is true, as Ethan Kleinberg has pointed out, that ‘there are very few who actively use deconstruction as a historical methodology’, there are many more historians who concentrate largely on textual interpretation, the construction of narratives from different perspectives and analogical comparison, all of which obscures the necessity of causal analysis: E. Kleinberg, ‘Haunting History: Deconstruction and the Spirit of Revision’, History and Theory, 46 (2007), 114.
L. Stone, ‘History and Post-Modernism’, Past and Present, 131 (1991), 217–18
P. Joyce, ‘History and Post-Modernism’, Past and Present, 133 (1991), 204–9.
J. Appleby, ‘The Power of History’, American Historical Review, 103 (1998), 8.
G. M. Spiegel, ‘History and Post-Modemism’, Past and Present, 135 (1992), 195.
D. Harlan, ‘Intellectual History and the Return of Literature’, American Historical Review, 94 (1989), 582.
J. Appleby, ‘One Good Turn Deserves Another: Moving beyond the Linguistic’, American Historical Review, 94 (1989), 1326–32.
Ibid., 6. Stephen Turner, ‘Cause, Law and Probability’, Sociological Theory, 5 (1987), 16
Jay, ‘Textual Approach’, 160. On the ‘revolution’ wrought by ‘contextualism’ in the 1960s and 70s, see M. Bevir, ‘Contextualism: From Modernist Method to Post-Analytic Historicism’, journal of the Philosophy of History, 3 (2009), 212.
H. White, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe (Baltimore, MD, 1973); idem, Con tent of theForm, 1–82, 185–214; also F. Ankersmit and H. Kellner (eds), A New Philosophy of History (Chicago, IL, 1995); R. Ankersmit, ‘Historiography and Postmodernism’ and ‘Reply to Professor Zagorin, History and Theory; 28 (1989), 137–53
A. Megill, ‘Recounting the Past: “Description”, Explanation and Narrative in Historiography’, American Historical Review, 94 (1989), 627–53
J. Toews, ‘Stories of Difference and Identity: New Historicism in Literature and History’, Monatshefte, 84 (1992), 204–8
R. Jacoby ‘A New Intellectual History?’, American Historical Review, 97 (1992), 405–24.
White, Metahistory, 7. H. Paul, ‘Hayden White: The Making of a Philosopher of History’, Journal of the Philosophy of History, 5 (2011), 131–45.
Q. Skinner, ‘Motives, Intentions and Interpretation’, in idem, Visions of Politics: Regarding Method (Cambridge, 2002), vol. 1, 98. For a critique of Skinner’s reading of Wittgenstein, see A. Burns, ‘Conceptual History and the Philosophy of the Later Wittgenstein: A Critique of Quentin Skinner’s Contextualist Method’, Journal of the Philosophy of History, 5 (2011), 54–83.
L. O. Mink, ‘Change and Causality in the History of Ideas’, Eighteenth-Century Studies, 2 (1968), 7–25.
Skinner, ‘Motives, Intentions and Interpretation’, 98–99. V. Brown, ‘Historical Interpretation, Intentionalism and Philosophy of Mind’, journal of the Philosophy of History, 1 (2007), 25–62.
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© 2014 Mark Hewitson
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Hewitson, M. (2014). Intellectual Historians and the Content of the Form. In: History and Causality. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137372406_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137372406_2
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