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Introduction: Causality after the Linguistic Turn

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History and Causality
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Abstract

The question ‘What is history?’ has elicited many different answers. For Herodotus, one of the first historians, it was a form of ‘inquiry’ such –that neither the deeds of men may be forgotten by lapse of time, nor the works great and marvellous, which have been produced some by Hellenes and some by Barbarians, may lose their renown; and especially that the causes may be remembered for which these waged war with one another’.2 Historians continue to debate which part of Herodotus’s definition is the principal one: a story of ‘deeds’ (human actions), a record of ‘works’ (artefacts and other traces) or an evaluation of ‘causes’ (reasons why actions or events occurred or ‘causes’ were taken up). Many now contend that history is ‘an authored narrative’, which tells a story by recounting a sequence of events in a particular manner, as an act of narration.3 More empirically minded scholars emphasize facts and evidence, which are held to constitute the record and structure the narrative. Post-structuralists, appealing to hermeneutics and literary criticism, concentrate on the techniques, lapses, tropes, genres, epistemology and ideology of representation and narration by historians-as-authors within historical texts and discourses. Neither pay much, if any, attention to causes. Few recent works on historical methods and theory have devoted chapters to the examination of causality and to the identification, framing, analysis and justification of questions.4

Before the effect, one believes in different causes than one does afterwards.

Friedrich Nietzsche, Die fröhliche Wissenschaft (1887)1

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Notes

  1. Nancy Cartwright, ‘Where Is the Theory in Our “Theories” of Causality’, Journal of Philosophy, 103 (2006), 55–66

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  2. C. Lloyd, ‘Toward Unification: Beyond the Antinomies of Knowledge in Historical Social Science’, History and Theory, 47 (2008), 396–412.

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  3. For a thoughtful dissection of the various positions, all of which are distinguishable from the methods of natural sciences and from Hempel’s notion of a covering law, see G. Steinmetz, ‘Critical Realism and Historical Sociology’, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 40 (1998), 170–86.

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  4. Z. Norkus, ‘Troubles with Mechanisms: Problems of the “Mechanistic Turn” in Historical Sociology and Social History’, Journal of the Philosophy of History, 1 (2007), 160–200.

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  5. Ibid., 66. Contrast this approach with that of Maurice Mandelbaum, who also draws attention to the use of historical as well as experimental data in natural sciences and the use of different forms of generalization in history and other social sciences: M. Mandelbaum, ‘Causal Analysis in History’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 3 (1942), 30–50.

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  6. This interest in ‘laws’ was also common in history: see M. Mandelbaum, ‘A Critique of Philosophies of History’, Journal of Philosophy, 45 (1948), 365.

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  7. C. G. Hempel, ‘Explanation in Science and History’ (1963), in J. H. Fetzer (ed.), The Philosophy of Carl G. Hempel: Studies in Science, Explanation and Rationality (Oxford, 2001), 295. On the way in which Hempel has been used to discredit an approach, see P. A. Roth, ‘The Full Hempel: The Logic of Historical Explanation by Clayton Roberts’, History and Theory, 38 (1999), 249–63.

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  8. S. P. Turner, ‘How Not to Do Science’, Sociological Quarterly, 49 (2008), 237–51.

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  9. D. Lewis, ‘Causation’, Journal of Philosophy, 70 (1973), 556.

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  10. R. Bhaskar, Reclaiming Reality (London, 1989), 82–3; idem, A Realist Theory of Science, revised edn. (London, 2008), 63–142. Also, A. Danto, ‘On Explanations in History’, Philosophy of Science, 23 (1956), 15–30.

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  11. See, for instance, D. Little, Varieties of Social Explanation: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Social Science (Boulder, CO, 1991); idem, Microfoundations, Method and Causation: On the Philosophy of the Social Sciences (New Brunswick, NJ, 1998); R. Adcock and D. Collier, ‘Measurement Validity: A Shared Standard for Qualitative and Quantitative Research’, American Political Science Review, 95 (2001), 529–46.

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  12. R. W. Fogel, ‘The Limits of Quantitative Methods in History’, American Historical Review, 80 (1975), 329–50.

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  13. Even ‘middle-range theories’ have tended to accept the possibility of quantification and calculations of probability in accordance with the proposition ‘the greater the x, the greater the y’. See, for example, S. P. Turner, ‘Many Approaches, but Few Arrivals: Merton and the Columbia Model of Theory Construction’, Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 39 (2009), 189–96.

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  14. Lutz Niethammer, ‘Afterthoughts on Posthistoire’, History and Memory, 1 (1989), 27–53

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  15. E. Kleinberg, ‘Haunting History: Deconstruction and the Spirit of Revision’, History and Theory, 46 (2007), 114.

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  16. G. M. Spiegel, ‘The Task of the Historian’, American Historical Review, 114 (2009), 1–15

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  17. See Chapter 5. This equation of covering laws and causal explanation has caused confusion over the last decades, despite the careful distinctions made between the two in the 1940s, 1950s, 1960s and 1970s: for example, A. Danto, ‘On Explanations in History’, Philosophy of Science, 23 (1956), 15–30.

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© 2014 Mark Hewitson

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Hewitson, M. (2014). Introduction: Causality after the Linguistic Turn. In: History and Causality. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137372406_1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137372406_1

  • Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London

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  • Online ISBN: 978-1-137-37240-6

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