Abstract
In a journal article ‘People with cognitive disabilities: The argument from marginal cases and social work ethics’, Gerald O’Brien (2003, p. 335, emphasis added) writes:
Seeking to engage the public in questioning our consideration and treatment of animals is fine, as long as vulnerable humans are not harmed in the process. Unfortunately, the animal rights movement, invested as it is in the AMC [Argument from Marginal Cases], cannot guarantee this. As it is described in the writings of animal rights scholars, the AMC is in opposition to core social work values and must be vigorously challenged by members of the profession. The dignity and worth of people living on the margins of society is diminished when we bestow quasi-human status on them or suggest that their moral standing is comparable to animals.
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Ryan, T. (2014). The Moral Priority of Vulnerability and Dependency: Why Social Work Should Respect Both Humans and Animals. In: Ryan, T. (eds) Animals in Social Work. The Palgrave Macmillan Animal Ethics Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137372291_6
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