Abstract
The Conservatives won the May 1979 election with a majority of 43 after enjoying the biggest electoral swing since 1945. The election manifesto had set out ‘a broad framework for the recovery of our country, based not on dogma, but on reason, on common sense, above all on the liberty of the people under the law’.2 There were general commitments to published monetary targets and a lower Public Sector Borrowing Requirement (PSBR). There was a pledge to cut income tax ‘at all levels’, and a promise to ‘simplify’ VAT. There was a passage on ‘responsible pay bargaining’, long on the dangers of irresponsible pay bargaining, but short on specific commitments. There was no mention of the exchange rate. In short, the manifesto was an uneasy compromise between the ideologically attractive and the politically feasible, which, despite the claims made for a radical break in 1979, contained little, in economic terms, that the outgoing Labour Chancellor could have fundamentally disagreed with. The overarching aim was much the same as before — sustainable growth, to be achieved by lowering inflation and restoring incentives. As Tim Congdon points out, ‘The structure and form of policy, with the focus on quantified limits to monetary growth and the PSBR, were identical to those in the last two-and-a-half years of Denis Healey’s Chancellorship’.3
Control of the money [supply] operates through the simple but brutal means of butchering company profits. Ultimately insolvency and unemployment teach employers and workers alike that they need to behave reasonably and sensibly.
Lord Cockfield, Minister of State, HM Treasury, 1981.1
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Notes
I T.G. Congdon, Monetarism Lost: And Why It Must Be Regained (London, 1989), p. 12. Alfred Sherman of the Centre for Policy Studies agrees: ‘the Treasury team — headed by Geoffrey Howe … and guided by Adam Ridley from the CRD — perpetuated the post-IMF policies of Denis Healey, A. Sherman, Paradoxes of Power (Exeter, 2005), p. 104.
J.A.H.L. Hoskyns, Just in Time: Inside the Thatcher Revolution (London, 2000), p. 263.
N. Lawson, The View from No. 11: Memoirs of a Tory Radical (London, 1992), p. 36.
R.E.G. Howe, Conflict of Loyalty (London, 1994), pp. 140–41.
S. Brittan, The Role and Limits of Government: Essays in Political Economy (London, 1983), p. 248.
T.N. Beckett, ‘Director-General’s national conference speech 1980’, 11 November 1980, TNA, PREM 19/490. Underlining in original.
A.M.W. Battishill, ‘Personal taxation: background to the Budget’, 19 January 1981, TNA, T366/726.
D.J. Needham, M.J. Oliver, and A. Riley, The 1981 Budget — Facts and Fallacies, 2012, p. 33. Published online at: http://www.chu.cam.ac.uk/archives/exhi-bitions/Witness_seminars.php, last accessed 13 August 2013.
F.A. Cockfield, ‘The money supply and inflation’, 21 January 1981, TNA, T386/549.
P.E. Middleton, ‘The money supply target’, 29 January 1981, TNA, T386/549.
Both the Treasury and the National Institute estimated the net impact of the final package would be to reduce GDP by just 0.5 per cent compared to unchanged policies, H.P. Evans, ‘Bryan Hopkin’s 1976 piece’, 10 April 1981, TNA, T388/189; National Institute Economic Review, vol. 96, no. 1 (May, 1981), p. 3.
G. Hacche and C. Taylor (eds), Inside the Bank of England: Memoirs of Christopher Dow, Chief Economist 1973–84 (Basingstoke, 2013), p. 216.
C. Johnson, The Economy Under Mrs Thatcher, 1979–1990 (London, 1991), p. 55
Middleton succeeded Wass as Permanent Secretary in 1983; P.E. Middleton, ‘Economic policy formation in the Treasury in the post-war period’, NIESR Jubilee lecture, National Institute Economic Review, vol. 127 (February, 1989), p. 50.
Quoted in R.K. Middlemas, ‘Margaret Thatcher, 1979–1990’, in V.B. Bogdanor (ed.), From New Jerusalem to New Labour: British Prime Ministers from Attlee to Blair (Basingstoke, 2010), p. 151.
Mrs Thatcher was distrustful of ‘graph paper economics’, R.E.G. Howe, ‘The 364 economists: ten years on’, Fiscal Studies, vol. 12, no. 4 (November, 1991), pp. 92–108.
Quoted in P.F.C. Stephens, Politics and the Pound: The Tories, the Economy and Europe (London, 1997), p. 31.
Volcker himself rejected the argument for a Medium-Term Financial Strategy because he was concerned about its ability to withstand structural change within the US financial system, C.A.E Goodhart, ‘Medium-Term Financial Plan’, 19 February 1980, BOE, 6A264/1; W. Greider, Secrets of the Temple (New York, 1987), p. 106.
C.R. Bean and N.F.R. Crafts, ‘British economic growth since 1945: relative economic decline … and Renaissance?’ In N.F.R. Crafts and G. Toniolo (eds), Economic Growth in Europe since 1945 (Cambridge, 1996), pp. 131–72.
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© 2014 Duncan Needham
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Needham, D. (2014). The Lady Is for Turning, 1979–82. In: UK Monetary Policy from Devaluation to Thatcher, 1967–82. Palgrave Studies in the History of Finance. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137369543_6
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