Abstract
On 4 March 1974, Harold Wilson returned to Downing Street at the head of a minority Labour government.2 The economic prospects were not good. Despite the recession, inflation was at its highest peacetime level since 1920.3 Following the oil shock, the current account deficit was forecast at £4 billion (5 per cent of Gross Domestic Product [GDP]) for the year ahead, and continuing industrial action meant much of the country was on a three-day week. The next two and a half years were amongst the most turbulent in recent British economic history. Growth was anaemic, unemployment rose to levels not seen since the 1930s, inflation peaked at 26.9 per cent, and a sterling crisis precipitated yet another application to the International Monetary Fund (IMF).4
Britain’s monetary regime was not built on the back of a stable equation or model of money, but on a conceit intended to shackle the state’s spending bureaucracies.
A.C. Hotson, 2010.1
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Notes
A.C. Hotson, ‘British monetary targets, 1976 to 1987: a view from the fourth floor of the Bank of England’, London School of Economics Financial Markets Group special paper, no. 190 (March, 2010), p. 3. Hotson’s analysis begins in 1976, so does not cover the econometric work that preceded CCC in 1971.
J. Barnett, Inside the Treasury (London, 1982), p. 15.
D.W.G. Wass, Decline to Fall: The Making of British Macro-economic Policy and the 1976 IMF Crisis (Oxford, 2008), p. 87.
D. Coates, Labour in Power? A Study of the Labour Government, 1974–1979 (London, 1980), p. 56
P. Bell, The Labour Party in Opposition, 1970–74 (London, 2004), p. 237.
B. Donoughue, Prime Minister; the Conduct of Policy under Harold Wilson and James Callaghan (London, 1987), p. 51
S. Ludlum, ‘The Gnomes of Washington; four myths of the 1976 IMF crisis’, Political Studies, vol. 40, no. 4 (December, 1992), pp. 713–27.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Copyright information
© 2014 Duncan Needham
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Needham, D. (2014). The PSBR Takes Over, 1974–76. In: UK Monetary Policy from Devaluation to Thatcher, 1967–82. Palgrave Studies in the History of Finance. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137369543_4
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137369543_4
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-47499-8
Online ISBN: 978-1-137-36954-3
eBook Packages: Palgrave Economics & Finance CollectionEconomics and Finance (R0)