Substance, Independence, and Unity

Part of the Philosophers in Depth book series (PID)


Hylomorphism is the position popular among neo-Aristotelian metaphysicians according to which unified wholes (such as presumably organisms) are in some sense compounds of matter (hylè) and form (morphè). Neo-Aristotelians also often find themselves drawn to an account of substancehood which centers on the idea that the substances are just those entities which are ontologically independent, according to some preferred notion of ontological independence. But what this preferred notion of ontological independence is in terms of which a successful criterion of substancehood can be formulated has been a difficult and controversial question.1


Proper Part Substance Status Primary Substance Composite Substance Substance Candidate 
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© Kathrin Koslicki 2013

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