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Substance, Independence, and Unity

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Aristotle on Method and Metaphysics

Part of the book series: Philosophers in Depth ((PID))

Abstract

Hylomorphism is the position popular among neo-Aristotelian metaphysicians according to which unified wholes (such as presumably organisms) are in some sense compounds of matter (hylè) and form (morphè). Neo-Aristotelians also often find themselves drawn to an account of substancehood which centers on the idea that the substances are just those entities which are ontologically independent, according to some preferred notion of ontological independence. But what this preferred notion of ontological independence is in terms of which a successful criterion of substancehood can be formulated has been a difficult and controversial question.1

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Authors
  1. Kathrin Koslicki
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Pasadena City College, California, USA

    Edward Feser

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© 2013 Kathrin Koslicki

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Koslicki, K. (2013). Substance, Independence, and Unity. In: Feser, E. (eds) Aristotle on Method and Metaphysics. Philosophers in Depth. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137367907_9

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