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The Phainomenological Method in Aristotle’s Metaphysics

Chapter
Part of the Philosophers in Depth book series (PID)

Abstract

It is understandable that those wishing to characterize Aristotle’s philosophical method have looked for guidance almost without exception to a passage in Nicomachean Ethics vii 1, where he prefaces his discussion of the puzzling phenomenon of akrasia (weakness of will) with an uncharacteristic methodological preamble. In this preamble, Aristotle contends, “We must set out the appearances (phainomena) and run through all the puzzles regarding them” (EN vii 1, 1145b2–4). Thereafter, having systematized the phainomena and re-interpreted or rejected those proving problematic, we may rest content: any proof we may wish for in this domain is already provided in this procedure (EN vii 1, 1145b5–7).

Keywords

Category Theory Nicomachean Ethic Ancient Philosophy Locus Classicus Internal Realism 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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© Christopher Shields 2013

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