The IGC Mandate and the Draft Reform Treaty

Part of the Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics book series (PSEUP)


There can be very few people who at the start of 2007, given the snaillike progress that was being made in extricating the EU from the political crisis caused by rejection of the Constitutional Treaty, could have either predicted or expected that the June European Council would adopt a mandate for a new IGC to begin work. Neither the German Council Presidency nor the focal points that Merkel had asked fellow EU leaders to appoint seriously expected a mandate to be agreed (Maurer, 2008b). Even on 19 June when the first draft mandate was circulated to the focal points there was little indication that EU leaders anticipated, when deciding 48 hours later on whether to launch an IGC, they would also be considering such a lengthy and detailed set of instructions for a new treaty. The German Council Presidency report the previous Friday had simply suggested that the European Council should ‘give a precise and comprehensive mandate to the IGC’ (Council of the European Union, 2007a: 5). There had been no formal ‘negotiations’ on a mandate per se; only ‘consultations’ on how to settle the issue of what to do with the Constitutional Treaty had been conducted.


Member State Foreign Affair European Council National Parliament Judicial Cooperation 
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Copyright information

© David Phinnemore 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Queen’s University BelfastUK

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