The German Council Presidency I: Focal Points and Reverse Engineering

Abstract

By the end of 2006 and a year-and-a-half of so-called ‘reflection’ it was still far from clear how the EU intended to try and extricate itself from the constitutional crisis caused by the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands in 2005. Three broad positions existed. First, there were supporters of the Constitutional Treaty, primarily but not exclusively member states which had completed ratification, who wished to see the Constitutional Treaty enter into force. Second, there were France and the Netherlands, still coming to terms with the negative outcomes to their referendums and yet to decide how best to proceed. And third, there were the remaining nonratifiers, some of which showed little or no enthusiasm for the Constitutional Treaty and appeared quite content, despite having signed the treaty, to see it abandoned. Others were not wholly opposed to the Constitutional Treaty’s revival but had reservations.