Out of the Blue: The Campaign in Retrospect

  • Philip Cowley
  • Dennis Kavanagh


The Conservative election victory of 2015 overturned many expectations. It had been widely expected that the fragmentation of the party system would produce yet another hung parliament, out of which would emerge another coalition or post-election deal. The era of one-party majority government seemed to be over. David Cameron’s victory also belied predictions — made, for example, by Mervyn King, the Governor of the Bank of England — that the measures needed to deal with the economy would be so unpopular that they would keep the winner of the 2010 election out of office for a generation.1


Electoral System Vote Share Party System Election Campaign Labour Government 
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© The Editor(s) 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  • Philip Cowley
    • 1
  • Dennis Kavanagh
    • 2
  1. 1.Queen Mary University of LondonUK
  2. 2.University of LiverpoolUK

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