Abstract
The word “conscience” derives from the Latin word “conscientia.” In its linguistic origins, the term “conscience” signified shared (con) knowledge (science).1 According to the Longman Contemporary English Dictionary, the conscience is “the part of your mind that tells you whether what you are doing is morally right or wrong.”2 Eide and Mubanya-Chipoya, in their report to the United Nations, interpret the meaning of conscience thus: “genuine ethical convictions, which may be of religious or humanist inspiration, and supported by a variety of sources.”3
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Notes
K. L. Lynch, “Voting One’s Conscience,” Society 42 (2005): 27
see also D. Shelton, “Conscientious Objection to Religious Groups,” in International Protection of Religious Freedom, ed. J.-F. Flauss (Bruxelles: Bruylant, 2002), 153
B. Vermeulen, “Scope and Limits of Conscientious Objections,” in Freedom of Conscience, Council of Europe (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 1993), 76.
Longman Group, Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English (Essex: Longman Group Limited Publications, 2000), 284.
A. Eide and C. Mubanga-Chipoya, “Conscientious Objection to Military Service,” UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1983/30 (New York and Geneva: UN Publication, 1983), Para. 21.
A/C.3/SR.1021. For further information see L. M. Hammer, The International Human Right to Freedom of Conscience: Some Suggestions for Its Development andApplication (Dartmouth: Ashgate, 2001), 116.
For further information on different bases of convictions see G. N. Taylor, The Legislative Tradition of Concientious Objection and Its Future in the Nuclear Age (PhD Thesis, London: King’s College London, 1994), 169–264
J. F. Childress, “Appeals to Conscience,” Ethics 89 (1979): 315–335
A. J. Bahm, “Theories of Conscience,” Ethics 75 (1965): 128–131
P. Fuss, “Conscience,” Ethics 74 (1964): 111–120
N. Rotenstreich, “Conscience and Norm,” Journal of Value Inquiry 27 (1993): 29–37
M. C. McGuire, “On Conscience,” Journal of Philosophy 60 (1963): 253–262.
Louis Le Fur divides the evolutionary period of international law into three eras. The first era finishes at the end of the Middle Ages (the fifteenth century); the second period begins with the Renaissance (the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries) and Reformation (the sixteenth century) and continues until the nineteenth century, while the third period begins in the nineteenth century and continues until the present day (L. Le Fur, “La Théorie du Droit Naturel Depuis le XVIIème Siècle et la Doctrine Moderne,” RCADI 18 (1927– III): 266–267, cited in A. E. Öktem, Uluslararasi Hukukta İnanç Özgürlüğü; (Ankara: Liberte Yayinlari, 2002), 11).
N. Lerner, Group Rights and Discrimination in International Law, International Studies in Human Rights, vol. 15 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1991), 4.
For further discussion about the relationship between the concepts of religious tolerance and freedom of conscience see A. Krishnaswami, “Study of Discrimination in the Matter of Religious Rights and Practices,” UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub. 2/200/Rev.1 (New York and Geneva: UN Publication, 1960), 4–11
M. McDougal, H. Lasswell, and L. Chen, Human Rights and World Public Order: The Basic Policies of an International Law of Human Dignity (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1980), 663–664
Hammer, The International Human Right, 9–10; B. Dickson, “The United Nations and Freedom of Religion,” International and Comparative Law Quarterly 44 (1995): 331–332.
Krishnaswami, “Study of Discrimination,” 1–12; see also B. Tiernay, “Religious Rights: A Historical Perspective,” in Religious liberty in Western Thought, ed. N. B. Reynolds and Jr. W. C. Durham (Atlanta, GA: Scholars, 1996), 29.
See “Concerning Idolatry” (De idololatria) (in 198–202 AD) and “Concerning the Soldier’s Garland” (De corona militis) (in 211). For further information on Tertullian’s works see J. Helgeland, J. D. Robert, and J. P. Burns, Christians and the Military: The Early Experience (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1985)
W. Hamel, Din ve Vicdan Hürriyeti (İstanbul: Yeni Asya Yayinlari, 1973), 23
see also E. Arnold, The Peace of God (Ashton Keynes, Wilts: The Plough Publishing House, 1940), 60–62.
N. Blough, “Do Not Repay Anyone Evil for Evil”—The Pacifsm of the Gospel (Wetzalar: Church and Peace, 2000), 12.
Krishnaswami, “Study of Discrimination,” 1–12; M. Bates, Religious Liberty: An Inquiry (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1945), 260–280.
P. Abelard, Peter Abelard’s Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon, 2002), 55–57, 67, 97, cited in Tiernay, “Religious Rights,” 37.
T. Aquinas, Summa Theologiae (Grand Rapids: Christian Classics Ethereal Library, 1947), pt. 1.2ae, quest. 19, Article 5, cited in Tiernay, “Religious Rights,” 37.
J. Remmelink, “General Report,” in Freedom of Conscience, Council of Europe (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 1993), 199.
H. Kamen, The Rise of Toleration (Verona: Arnoldo Mondodori, 1967), 20; see also Hammer, The International Human Right, 12.
M. Maneli, Freedom and Tolerance (New York: Octagon Books, 1984), 85–86; see also Hammer, The International Human Right, 12.
See 1579 Union of Utrecht, Article XIII. For further information see also M. D. Evans, Religious Liberty and lnternational Law in Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 49 and Hamel, Din ve Vicdan Hürriyeti, 26.
It is also called the Peace of Westphalia which is commonly used to include the treaties of Münster and Osnabrück. The Treaty of Münster was signed by France and the Holy Roman Empire, and the Treaty of Osnabrück was signed by Sweden and the Holy Roman Empire on October 24, 1648 (See D. Croxton, “The Peace of Westphalia of 1648 and the Origins of Sovereignty,” The International History Review 21 (1999): 569–591).
P. Lanarès, La Libertè Religieuse Dans les Conventions Internationales et Dans le Droit Public en Général (Paris: Horvath, 1964), 93–97
R. Redslob, Historie des Grands Principes du Droit des Gens Depuis l’antiquité Jusqu’à la veille de la Grande Guerre (Paris: Rouseeau et Cie, 1923), 215–216, cited in Öktem, Uluslararasi Hukukta, 37.
M. Boegner, “L’Influence de la Réforme sur le Développement du Droit International,” Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de Droit Internaitonal 6 (1925): 304, cited in Öktem, Uluslararasi Hukukta, 38–39.
M. Ganji, International Protection of Human Rights (Geneva: Librarie E. droz, 1962), 153; Hammer, The lnternational Human Right, 15–16
D. A. J. Richards, Conscience and the Constitution: History, Theory, and Law of the Recontructions Amendments (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 66.
M. Fitzpatrick, P. Jones, C. Knellwolf, and I. McCalman (eds.), The Enlightenment World (London and New York: Routledge, 2004), 53, 63, 466, 548.
J. Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration (Huddersfield: J. Brook, 1796), 61–62.
Tiernay, B., “Religious Rights: A Historical Perspective,” in Religious liberty in Western Thought, ed. N. B. Reynolds and Jr. W. C. Durham (Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1996), 54. notably, some thinkers, in referring to a Baptist pamphlet of 1661, asserted that freedom of conscience was part of Christianity (“Sion’s Groan,” in Underhill, ed., Tracts, 379, cited in Tiernay, “Religious Rights,” 51).
Maneli, Freedom and Tolerance, 100–101; M. Fitzpatrick, “Enlightenment and Conscience,” in Religious Conscience, the State, and the Law: Historical Contexts and Contemporary Significance, ed. J. McLaren and H. Coward (New York: Suny Press, 1999), 50; Hammer, The International Human Right, 18.
Krishnaswami, “Study of Discrimination,” 5; see also A. Murdoch, “A Crucible for Change: Enlightenment in Britain,” in The Enlightenment World, ed. M. Fitzpatrick, P. Jones, C. Knellwolf, and I. McCalman (London and New York: Routledge, 2004), 104–116.
I. Kant, Religion within the Limits ofReason Alone, Book III, “The Victory of the Good over the Evil Principle, and the Founding of a Kingdom of God on Earth’ General Observation” (New York: Harper Torchbook, 1960), 129. For further information on this subject see H. J. Gilbert, The Right to Freedom of Belief A Conceptual Framework (PhD Thesis, Colchester: University of Essex, 2001), 10–15
A. Schinkel, Conscience and Conscientious Objections (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006), 245–305.
Article 2 of the Congress of Vienna of 1814 states: “There shall be no change in the articles of the Fundamental Law which assure to all religious cults equal protection and privileges, and guarantee the admissibility of all citizens, whatever be their religious creed, to public office and dignities.” (For further information see A. L. Del Russo, International Protection of Human Rights (Washington, DC: Lerner Law Books, 1971), 17 Hammer, The International Human Right, 19; Evans, Religious Liberty, 57–58).
H. D. Thoreau, On the Duty of Civil Disobedience (Minneapolis: Filiquarian Publishing, LLC, 2007), 6, 7, and 50. For further information on civil disobedience, conscience, and Thoreau see also Hammer, The International Human Right, 22–23;
B. Russell, On Civil Disobedience (London: National Youth Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, 1961)
A. Harvey, Theory and Practice of Civil Disobedience (New Hampshire: Raymond, 1961).
The International Convention of Constantinople of 1881, which was signed by Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia, Sardinia, Ottoman Empire, and Russia. The Treaty of Paris of 1898 was signed by Spain and the United States of America (For further information on these treaties see Evans, Religious Liberty, 65–68; see also W. Philliomore, Three Centuries of Treaties of Peace (London: John Murray, 1917)).
Article 22(5) states: “responsible for the administration of the territory under conditions which will guarantee freedom of conscience and religion.” (For further information on this mandate see Hammer, The International Human Right, 24; see also Evans, Religious Liberty, 83–103 and F. A. Wilson, The Origins ofthe League Covenant: Documentary History ofIts Drafting (London: Hogarth, 1928), 106).
For further information see L. Sohn and T. Buergenthal (eds.), Basic Documents on International Protection of Human Rights (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1973), 242, 244; see also McDougal et al., Human Rights and World Public Order, 671–672; Hammer, The International Human Right, 25; Evans, Religious Liberty, 132–135; Capotorti, “Study on the Rights,” 17–18.
Childress, “Appeals to Conscience,” 318; see also S. Freud, Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (London: Hogarth and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1921)
D. Langston, Conscience and Other Virtues: From Bonaventure to MacIntyre (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001)
Shelton, “Conscientious Objection,” 154; Gilbert, The Right to Freedom of Belief, 46; C. Taylor, Source of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 27 Vermeulen, “Scope and Limits,” 76–78, Remmelink, “General Report,” 200.
K. Boyle, “Freedom of Conscience, Pluralism and Tolerance: Freedom of Conscience in International Law,” in Freedom of Conscience, Council of Europe (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 1993), 38.
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© 2013 Özgür Heval Çınar
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Çınar, Ö.H. (2013). Conscience and Freedom of Conscience. In: Conscientious Objection to Military Service in International Human Rights Law. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137366085_2
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