Abstract
Although Churchill described the Japanese attack on the American naval base at Pearl Harbor, on 7 December 1941, as the ‘felon blow’ which led to the Japanese gaining ‘mastery of the Pacific’, America was now officially in the war.2 The wartime Anglo-American alliance, which Churchill had nurtured for so long, was, at last, formally declared and acknowledged the world over. The road to Pearl Harbor, which stretched back beyond the kurai tanima or ‘dark valley’ to the aftermath of the First World War, had been a long one.3 The momentum which the Japanese gathered as they launched themselves from the Marco Polo Bridge towards Hawaii had been underestimated by almost everyone in the higher echelons of British and American government — not just by Churchill, who acknowledged in his memoir that he could ‘not pretend to have measured accurately the martial might of Japan’.4 Like successive British governments since the termination of the Anglo-Japanese alliance in 1923, Churchill’s wartime national government had no realistic British policy in place for dealing with a rival imperial power in the Far East.5 In the simplest of terms, the policy was for America to attend to Japan. But how could Churchill, especially when he was at the helm, narrate this weakness in British strategy and British imperial power in his memoir without it reflecting poorly on himself or Britain?
There was a veil over my mind about the Japanese War. All the proportions were hidden in mist.1
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Churchill, BBC broadcast, London, 13 May 1945 in David Cannadine (ed.), The Speeches of Winston Churchill (London: Penguin, 1990), p. 262; Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War: Volume III, The Grand Alliance (London: Cassell, 1950), p. 545. America and Britain both declared war against Japan on 8 Decemberember 1941.
The attack on Pearl Harbor continues to be extensively researched. The most comprehensive leading accounts are: Akira Iriye, Pearl Harbor and the Coming of the Pacific War: A Brief History with Documents and Essays (Boston, MA: Bedford, 1999); William Bruce Johnson, The Pacific Campaign in World War II: From Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal (London: Routledge, 2006); Ronald H. Spector, Eagle Against the Sun: The American War with Japan (London: Viking, 1984); Iguchi Takeo, Demystifying Pearl Harbor: A New Perspective from Japan (Tokyo: International House of Japan, 2010); and John Toland, Infamy: Pearl Harbor and its Aftermath (London: Methuen, 1982).
Audrey Sansbury Talks, A Tale of Two Japans: 10 Years to Pearl Harbor (Brighton: Book Guild Publishing, 2010), p. xi. This ten-year period is generally taken to mean the decade from 1931, starting with Japan’s invasion of Manchuria.
See Michael A. Barnhart, ‘Japan’s Economic Security and the Origins of the Pacific War’, Journal of Strategic studies, 4/2 (1981), pp. 105–24. Barnhart convincingly argues that American economic sanctions did not act as the major impetus for Japan to attack Pearl Harbor. Rather it was the internal tension between the Japanese navy and army which pushed Japan to war. See also Michael A. Barnhart, Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic Security, 1919–1941 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987; reprinted 1988) in which his thesis is analysed in more detail and which partially backs up Churchill’s assertion that the ‘immediate cause of the Pacific War was the failure of the Hull-Nomura negotiations’, p. 263.
Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War: Volume I, The Gathering Storm (London: Cassell, 1948), pp. 3–15.
David Reynolds, In Command of History: Churchill Fighting and Writing the Second World War (London: Allen Lane, 2004), p. 85.
Union of Democratic Control, Eastern Menace: The Story of Japanese Imperialism (London: Union of Democratic Control, 1936).
Although the Anglo-Japanese Alliance may have been formalised in 1902, an informal relationship (and one which went through on-off stages) had existed since the Iwakura mission of 1872–4. See Ian Nish, ‘Origins of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance: In the shadow of the Dreibund, in Phillips Payson O’Brien (ed.), The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1902–1922 (London: Routledge, 2004), pp. 8–25, for the long view of the history of the 1902 Alliance.
L.J. Butler, Britain and Empire: Adjusting to a Post-Imperial World (London: I.B. Tauris, 2002), p. 24.
Lt-Comdr. Tota Ishimaru, Japan Must Fight Britain, translated by Instructor-Capt. G.V. Rayment (London: Hurst & Blackett, 1936), p. ix. Ishimaru would write that Japan had learnt lessons from Germany’s defeat in the First World War in that ‘ignoring diplomacy, setting up military despotism, or, in unnecessary haste, shouting down our diplomatists, is to repeat the mistake that led Germany to disaster: it is not the way to make our country great, p. xi.
For a comprehensive and persuasive argument over the myth surrounding the contemporary perception of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance see: Anthony Best, ‘The “Ghost” of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance: An Examination into Historical Myth-Making’, Historical Journal, 49/3 (2006), pp. 811–31.
Robert J. Gowen, ‘British Legerdemain at the 1911 Imperial Conference: The Dominions, Defense Planning, and the Renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance’, Journal of Modern History, 52/3 (1980), pp. 385–413.
Robert O’Neill, ‘Churchill, Japan, and British Security in the Pacific, 1904–1942’, in Roger Blake and Wm. Roger Louis (eds), Churchill: A Major New Assessment of his Life in Peace and War (Oxford: OUP, 1993), p. 276.
O’Neill, ‘Churchill, Japan, and British Security in the Pacific’, p. 276, referencing Martin Gilbert (ed.), Winston S. Churchill: Volume III, 1914–1916 (London: Heinemann, 1971), Churchill to Grey, 11 August 1914, p. 43.
Robert J. Gowen, ‘Great Britain and the Twenty-One Demands of 1915: Cooperation versus Effacement’, Journal of Modern History, 43/1 (1971), pp. 76–106.
The Japanese Navy did, however, help the British to suppress the Singapore mutiny, that of the 5th Light Infantry in February 1915: see Ian Beckett, ‘The Singapore mutiny of February, 1915’, Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research, 62 (1984); Nicholas Tarling, ‘The Singapore Mutiny of 1915’, Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, 55/2 (1982); Philip Mason, A Matter of Honour: An Account of the Indian Army, Its Officers and Men (London: Macmillan, 1986), pp. 425–7; and Budheswar Pati, India and the First World War, 1914–1918 (New Delhi: Atlantic Publishers, 1996), pp. 128–30. See Gilbert, Churchill: III, p. 44.
Recent scholarship has once again renewed the debate (first begun by A.J.P. Taylor) over the date when the Second World War began. The most persuasive are Evan Mawdsley, World War II: A New History (Cambridge: CUP, 2009), and Rana Mitter, China’s War with Japan, 1937–1945: The Struggle for Survival (London: Allen Lane, 2013). Both persuasively argue that the ‘Marco Polo Bridge Incident’ of 7 July 1937 (the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war) was the opening date of the Second World War.
For details of the Mukden incident which led to the Manchurian crisis see: W.G. Beasley, Japanese Imperialism, 1894–1945 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1987), pp. 175–97; and Louise Young, Japan’s Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999).
The conference was held in Washington DC, from 12 November 1921 to 6 February 1922, and was set-up and held without the aid of the League of Nations but with their tacit approval. The most all-encompassing publication on the Washington Conference is Erik Goldstein and John Maurer (eds), The Washington Conference, 1921–22: Naval Rivalry, East Asian Stability and the Road to Pearl Harbor (London: Cass, 1994). Individual works of note are Phillips Payson O’Brien, British and American Naval Power: Politics and Policy, 1900–1936 (London: Greenwood, 1998); and Emily O. Goldman, Sunken Treaties: Naval Arms Control between the Wars (Philadelphia: Pennsylvania University Press, 1994).
‘The Sinews of Peace, Churchill, Westminster College, Fulton, Missouri, 5 March 1946, in Randolph S. Churchill (ed.), Winston S. Churchill: Post-war Speeches, The Sinews of Peace (London: Cassell, 1948), p. 98.
See Keith Neilson, ‘“Unbroken Thread”: Japan, Maritime Power and British Imperial Defence, 1920–32, in Greg Kennedy (ed.), British Naval Strategy East of Suez, 1900–2000 (Abingdon: Frank Cass, 2005); and Stephen Roskill, Naval Policy Between the Wars: Volume I, The Period of Anglo-American Antagonism, 1919–1929 (London: Collins, 1968).
Ritchie Ovendale, ‘Sargent, Sir (Harold) Orme Garton (1884–1962)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford: OUP, 2004; online edition, January 2008).
Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War: Volume II: Their Finest Hour (London: Cassell, 1949), p. 225.
A.J.P. Taylor (ed.), Off the Record: W. P. Crozier, Political Interviews, 1933–1943 (London: Hutchinson, 1973), Churchill to Crozier, 26 July 1940, p. 176.
Churchill, Grand Alliance, Churchill speech, Mansion House, London, 10 November 1941, p. 528. For the full speech see Robert Rhodes James (ed.), Winston S. Churchill: His Complete Speeches: Volume VI, 1935–1942 (New York: Chelsea House, 1974), pp. 6504–12.
For a contemporary view of the Atlantic Charter see H.V. Morton, Atlantic Meeting (London: Methuen, 1944, 3rd edition).
Churchill made no reference to the long-standing informal arrangement between the United States and British navies (Plan Orange) which was renewed with meaning in January 1938. The plan reasoned that should war in the Pacific break out between Japan and either America or Britain, then America would assure Britain free use of her waters and vice versa. Such a plan had been loosely agreed since the Washington Naval Conference of 1921 as it acted as a bulwark against either Britain or America becoming rivals and prevented them from antagonising each other. See Edward S. Miller, War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897–1945 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1991).
Max Arthur (ed.), Lost Voices of the Royal Navy (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1996; edition, 2005), Lieutenant Michael Torrens-Spence, RN, p. 266.
See Thomas P. Lowry and John W.G. Wellham, The Attack on Taranto: Blueprint for Pearl Harbor (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1995; edition, 2000); David Wragg, Swordfish: The Story of the Taranto Raid (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2003; Cassell Military Paperbacks edition, 2004); and ‘Battle of Taranto, 1940’, <http://www.royal-navy.mod.uk/history/battles/tarant/index.htm> accessed 18 June 2011.
Richard Hough, Former Naval Person: Churchill and the Wars at Sea (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1985), p. 167. See for example: Correlli Barnett, Engage The Enemy More Closely: The Royal Navy in the Second World War (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1991), pp. 244–50; Viscount Andrew Cunningham, A Sailor’s Odyssey (London: Hutchinson, 1951;reprinted 1953), pp. 282–90;Nathan Miller, War At Sea: A Naval History of World War II (New York: Scribners, 1995), pp. 120–23;and Mark R. Peattie, Sunburst: The Rise of Japanese Naval Air Power, 1909–1941 (London: Chatham, 2001), pp. 129–67.
For a nuanced and detailed analysis on the attack on Taranto see Stephen W. Roskill, The War At Sea, 1939–1945: Volume I, The Defensive (London: HMSO, 1954; edition, 2004), pp. 300–301.
Arthur J. Marder, Old Friends, New Enemies: The Royal Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy, Strategic Illusions, 1936–1941 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1981), p. 314. See also Richard J. Overy, The Air War: 1939–1945 (London: Europa, 1980), who traces the origins of the strategy involved in the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor back to 1936 and Commander Genda Minoru (1904–1989) who ‘completed the development of Japanese carrier power by getting the navy to adopt his theory of the mass carrier strike-force, pp. 6–7.
Churchill, Grand Alliance, p. 524–5; Churchill made no mention of the brow beating’ he gave Admiral Pound when he insisted that Prince of Wales joined the Repulse. He also made no mention of how Indomitable was to join them had ‘she not been damaged in a grounding accident in the West Indies’: see Eric Grove, The Royal Navy since 1815 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 196. The idea of Force Z acting as a deterrent received credence from one of Churchill’s most trusted confidants, Smuts. The South African Prime Minister met and discussed the policy of sending the two ships to act as a deterrent against Japanese action with Phillips in Pretoria when the Prince of Wales berthed at Cape Town before sailing to Singapore.
Brian Bond (ed.), Chief of Staff: The Diaries of Lieutenant General Sir Henry Pownall: Volume II, 1940–1944 (London: Leo Cooper, 1974), undated entry on the Causes of Failure’, p. 96. The controversy over the loss of the Prince of Wales and the Repulse continued long after Churchill’s portrayal was published. For example, in 1962, Admiral William Davis wrote to Captain Stephen Roskill (who wrote the Official History of the Naval war) for verification regarding whether it was correct for a friend of his to say that the ships should never have been in Singapore area because of lack of proper air cover’, and that they had been sent there against expert advice’. CCAC, ROSK 4/79: Admiral William Davis to Captain Stephen Roskill, 6 April 1962.
Christopher M. Bell, Churchill and Sea Power (Oxford: OUP, 2013), p. 245. Bell writes that even though Churchill’s deterrent strategy was a failure — war with Japan ensued — the underlying logic was mostly sound’. Although Bell states that the nub of the episode is what the ships were doing in Singapore during peacetime [Bell’s italics] as war with Japan had yet to start, he nonetheless states that Churchill’s ‘overly optimistic assumptions’ were part of the reason as to why the deterrent strategy failed, pp. 247–53. In short, Force Z should have not been used offensively.
Rescues from the Prince of Wales and Repulse’, detailed that 2330 lives out of a total of 2925 lives were saved, The Times, 12 December 1941; Christopher M. Bell, ‘The “Singapore Strategy” and the Deterrence of Japan: Winston Churchill, the Admiralty and the Dispatch of Force Z’, English Historical Review, 116/467 (2001), p. 604.
Nigel Nicolson (ed.), The Harold Nicolson Diaries, 1907–1963 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2004), 19 December 1941, p. 255.
Harold Macmillan, The Blast of War, 1939–45 (London: Macmillan, 1967), p. 140.
Paul Kennedy wrote that Phillips had been ‘one of the most scornful of all about the dangers posed by aircraft to ships. See Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (London: Allen Lane, 1976; Fontana, 1991), p. 359.
Kelly recollected how Churchill had once commented that Commodore Allan could not ‘bear a single one of his ships going to the bottom without it going into my book. However as Kelly would point out, in the instance of the Prince of Wales and Repulse, this was not the case. See Martin Gilbert, Never Despair: Winston S. Churchill, 1945–1965: Volume VIII (London: Heinemann, 1988), p. 345.
Arthur Nicholson, Hostages to Fortune: Winston Churchill and the Loss of the Prince of Wales and Repulse (Stroud: Sutton Publishing, 2005), Nicholson citing Captain William Davis to Arthur Marder, 3 April 1975, p. 179.
See Martin Middlebrook and Patrick Mahoney, Battleship: The Loss of the Prince of Wales and the Repulse (London: Allen Lane, 1977; reprint 1979) for a thorough use of first hand witness accounts. See also Ian W. Toll, Pacific Crucible: War at Sea in the Pacific, 1941–42 (New York: Norton, 2012), pp. 53–8, for examples of how crew members had feelings of absolute confidence’ about their ability to chase and destroy Japanese warships off the coast of Singora.
Raymond Callahan, Churchill: Retreat from Empire (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1984), p. 245.
Sir John Kennedy, The Business of War: The War Narrative of Major-General Sir John Kennedy (London: Hutchinson, 1957), p. 7.
Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War: Volume IV, The Hinge of Fate (London: Cassell, 1951), p. 81.
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© 2014 Catherine A.V. Wilson
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Wilson, C. (2014). Churchill’s Imperial War with Japan. In: Churchill on the Far East in The Second World War. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137363954_4
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