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Enactive Cognition at the Edge of Sense-Making pp 153–180Cite as

Palgrave Macmillan

Learning to Perceive What We Do Not Yet Understand: Letting the World Guide Us

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Part of the book series: New Directions in Philosophy and Cognitive Science ((NDPCS))

Summary

This chapter aims to defend the thesis that we can only perceive what we understand. Such a theory would seem to be unable to account for our learning to perceive what we do not yet understand. To address this objection, the paper presents a non-representationalist, direct realist theory of perception. In this, the sensorimotor theory of Noë and O’Regan plays a crucial role (although one important modification to the interpretation of that theory is proposed). The result is an account of how we are in contact with the world itself during perceptual experi- ence; and this leads to an account of how the world itself guides our understanding, as we move from non-sense to sense.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of the Basque, Spain

    Michael Beaton (postdoctoral researcher)

Authors
  1. Michael Beaton
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. United Arab Emirates University, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates

    Massimiliano Cappuccio

  2. Universidad National Auionoma de Mexico, Mexico

    Tom Froese

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© 2014 Michael Beaton

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Beaton, M. (2014). Learning to Perceive What We Do Not Yet Understand: Letting the World Guide Us. In: Cappuccio, M., Froese, T. (eds) Enactive Cognition at the Edge of Sense-Making. New Directions in Philosophy and Cognitive Science. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137363367_7

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