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Breaking the Perception-Action Cycle: Experimental Phenomenology of Non-Sense and its Implications for Theories of Perception and Movement Science

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Enactive Cognition at the Edge of Sense-Making

Part of the book series: New Directions in Philosophy and Cognitive Science ((NDPCS))

Summary

Merleau-Ponty’s description of Cezanne’s working process reveals two things: first, cognition arises on the basis of perception and action, and, second, cognition arises out of frustration, when an agent confronts non-sense. We briefly present the history of the domain of philosophy and psychology that has claimed that perception-action comes before cognition, especially the work of Merleau-Ponty, Gibson, and Heidegger. We then present an experimental paradigm “front-loading” the Heideggerian phenomenology of encountering tools. The experiments consisted of a dynamical perception-action task and a cognitive task. The results reinforce the distinction between tools being experienced as ready-to-hand and turning into unready- or present-at-hand when sense-ma kin g was thwarted. A more cognitive attitude towards the task emerged when participants experienced non-sense. We discuss implica- tions of this for the movement sciences.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Cincinnati, USA

    Dobromir Dotov & Anthony Chemero (Professor of Philosophy and Psychology)

Authors
  1. Dobromir Dotov
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  2. Anthony Chemero
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. United Arab Emirates University, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates

    Massimiliano Cappuccio

  2. Universidad National Auionoma de Mexico, Mexico

    Tom Froese

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© 2014 Dobromir G. Dotov and Anthony Chemero

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Dotov, D., Chemero, A. (2014). Breaking the Perception-Action Cycle: Experimental Phenomenology of Non-Sense and its Implications for Theories of Perception and Movement Science. In: Cappuccio, M., Froese, T. (eds) Enactive Cognition at the Edge of Sense-Making. New Directions in Philosophy and Cognitive Science. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137363367_2

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