Summary
This chapter examines the phenomenon of “nonsensical gender” — that is, cases of breakdown within the domain of gender identity. First, it is argued that gender is a multifaceted system that shapes and subtends cognitive processing. Next, the chapter examines cases of gender break- down and compares those phenomena with other forms of cognitive breakdown. It is then contended that, while there are some striking similarities among all these failures to “make sense,” a crucial distinc- tion needs to be made: gender interactions, unlike human-tool interac- tions, are marked by complex intersubjective modes of meaning-making. Thus, in order to “make sense” of gender misidentification, the chapter argues for a more nuanced account of breakdown, one that pays more heed to the interpersonal and intrapersonal dimensions of social sensemaking.
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© 2014 Michele Merritt
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Merritt, M. (2014). Making (Non)sense of Gender. In: Cappuccio, M., Froese, T. (eds) Enactive Cognition at the Edge of Sense-Making. New Directions in Philosophy and Cognitive Science. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137363367_12
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137363367_12
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
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