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Introduction

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Enactive Cognition at the Edge of Sense-Making

Part of the book series: New Directions in Philosophy and Cognitive Science ((NDPCS))

Abstract

Ludwig Wittgenstein, in the attempt to take as far as possible a “naïve” correspondentialist and re presentational ist view on language (Hutto, 2004), had to face a resilient philosophical puzzle on the nature of nonsensical propositions (Wittgenstein, 1921/2001, 4.01): if our knowl- edge of the world is necessarily delimited by its representations, then what should we say about nonsensical expressions that represent nothing at all and that, nonetheless, allow us to relate to what is most valuable in our lives? If non-sense is situated outside the “limits of our language”, which bi-univocally correspond to the articulations of ontology (the “limits of our world”), then why is it the case that our words can capture the very notion of non-sense, allowing us to concur on its meaning? How is it possible that we know how to efficaciously respond to nonsen- sical expressions, and our beliefs seem affected by them in ways that are characteristic and significant?

Don’t for heaven’s sake, be afraid of talking nonsense! Only don’t fail to pay attention to your nonsense.

(Ludwig Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 64)

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Computer Science and Cybernetics, University of Reading, UK

    Tom Froese

Authors
  1. Massimiliano Cappuccio
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  2. Tom Froese
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. United Arab Emirates University, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates

    Massimiliano Cappuccio

  2. Universidad National Auionoma de Mexico, Mexico

    Tom Froese

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© 2014 Massimiliano Cappuccio and Tom Froese

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Cappuccio, M., Froese, T. (2014). Introduction. In: Cappuccio, M., Froese, T. (eds) Enactive Cognition at the Edge of Sense-Making. New Directions in Philosophy and Cognitive Science. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137363367_1

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