The Political Context of Economic Change, 1936

Abstract

On March 1, 1936, Stalin, in his interview with the American journalist Roy Howard, remarked that ‘it is difficult to say’ whether the Japanese or the German regions were the greater source of the war danger: ‘at present the Far Eastern source is the more active, but it is possible that the centre of the danger will move to Europe’.¹ This tentative prediction was dramatically fulfilled within a few days, when Germany on March 7 seized the Rhineland in violation of the Versailles treaty and the Locarno Pact. This threatening action at last led the French to ratify the Franco-Soviet Pact. And on May 3 the victory of the Popular Front in the French elections also strengthened Litvinov’s case for collective security. However, the British remained hostile to any effort to curb Germany. On March 17 Lord Cranborne, under-secretary of state for foreign affairs, privately urged: ‘Give Germany a free hand, as far as her and our League obligations permit, further East.’² When the League of Nations discussed the occupation of the Rhineland, Litvinov alone supported sanctions against Germany.