The Impossible Transfer

Abstract

’Northern’ accounts acknowledge that the Anglo-Argentine confidential talks held between 1966 and 1968 offered a major opportunity to settle the Falklands conflict — an opportunity embodied in a unique British offer to transfer sovereignty over the islands to Argentina. As examined in the Introduction, the hypotheses advanced to explain the ‘lost chance’ have centred on three main themes. By far the most popular has been the islanders’ resistance to change and their ability to express this resistance in parliament. Thus many would agree with Clive Ellerby’s assertion that ‘pragmatism would have probably led the British government to transfer the sovereignty of the Falklands had not the Falkland Lobby arisen to counter the pressure of Argentine demands’.¹ This has been complemented by an emphasis on bureaucratic factors (Foreign Office arrogance, the cabinet’s timidity and their underlying misperceptions of Argentine intentions) and by Argentine revisionists’ accent on Buenos Aires’ diplomatic inflexibility.