Abstract
In this chapter we delve into the theory of the symbol, drawing on recent (and older) work in the philosophy of religion and in philosophy more generally. We examine various functions that symbols have and, in the light of the work of such philosophers as Todorov and Ricoeur, as well as philosophical theologians such as Tillich, identify for special attention the participative function, whereby the wearing or use of the symbol brings about the inclusion of the user in a certain community of symbolusers. We suggest that legal thinking in general, and case judgments in particular, would be much enriched if, in addition to that paid to the expressive function, attention were also paid to the participative function.
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Notes
For a fuller discussion of some of the concepts introduced in this section, see D. Whistler (2013) Schelling’s Theory of Symbolic Language (Oxford: Oxford University Press), chapter 1.
A further interesting, if brief, discussion of the philosophical context to symbolism in relation to Article 9 can be found in P. Petkoff (2010) ‘Religious Symbols between Forum Internum and Forum Externum’ in S. Ferrari and R. Cristofori (eds) Law and Religion in the 21st Century (Farnham: Ashgate), pp. 299–301.
Lautsi v Italy [GC] [2011] ECHR 2412, (2012) 54 EHRR 3. (App no 30814/06, 18 March 2011.)
BVerfGE 93.1, 11 BvR 1087/91 Kruzifix-decision, 1 May 1995, translated and available at http://www.utexas.edu/law/academics/centers/transnational/work_new/german/case.php?id=615, date accessed 25 June 2013.
Lautsi 78 [42].
Lautsi 78 [42].
Quoted in N. Halmi (2007) The Genealogy of the Romantic Symbol (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 107.
Pseudo-Dionysius, (1987) ‘The Ecclesiastical Hierarchy’ in The Complete Works, tr. C. Luibheid (New York: Paulist Press), 376d.
See H-G. Gadamer (2004) Truth and Method, 2nd edn, tr. J. Weinsheimer and D. Marshall (London: Continuum), p. 63.
Rufinus, (1955) A Commentary on the Apostle’s Creed, tr. J. Kelly (London: Longmans), p. 30.
J. Goethe and F. Schiller (1914) Correspondence between Schiller and Goethe, tr. D. Schmitz (London: Bell), vol. 1, pp. 372–3.
Goethe’s prose on the symbol never loses this tortuous aspect. Take, for example, the following commentary on a painting of’ saint Peter near the fire’, ‘Natural fire will be presented, subjected only to the most limited extent to an artistic purpose, and we are right to call such presentations symbolic. … It is the thing itself, without being the thing, and yet the thing; an image summarised in the mirror of the spirit and nevertheless identical with the object.’ Quoted in T. Todorov (1982) Theories of the Symbol, tr. C. Porter (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), p. 174.
P. Ricoeur (1974) The Conflict of Interpretations, tr. D. Ihde (Evanston: Northwestern University Press), p. 289. See also Todorov, Theories of the Symbol, p. 203.
T. Todorov (1983) Symbol and Interpretation, tr. C. Porter (London: Routledge), p. 11.
C. Müller (1937) Die geschichtlichen Voraussetzungen des Symbolbegriffs in Goethes Kunstanschauung (Leipzig: Mayer), p. 14.
P. Tillich (1987) ‘Religious Symbols and Our Knowledge of God’ in J. Clayton (ed.) Main Works, vol. 4 (New York: De Gruyter), pp. 396–7.
Ricoeur, Conflict of Interpretations, p. 289.
A. Schlegel (1989) Vorlesungen über schöne Literatur und Kunst (Berlin 1801–1804) in E. Behler (ed.) Kritische Ausgabe der Vorlesungen (Paderborn: Schöningh), vol. 1, p. 211.
Tillich ‘The Word of God’ in Clayton (ed.), p. 412.
Tillich ‘The Religious Symbol’ in Clayton (ed.), p. 254. The difference can be measured in the attention we pay to the symbol, as opposed to the sign. Gadamer defines signs as follows: ‘Pure indication … is the essence of the sign. … It should not attract attention to itself in such a way that one lingers over it, for it is there only to make present something that is absent and to do so in such a way that the absent thing, and that alone, comes to mind’ (Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 145). The ‘innate power’ of the symbol, however, means that it draws attention to itself, as well as expressing an external meaning. The German Sinnbild suggests this to the extent that it implies an image which is already itself meaningful.
Indeed, Tillich himself recognizes this crucial aspect of symbolism: symbols gain and retain power only insofar as they are recognized by a ‘group unconscious’. Tillich ‘Religious Symbols and our Knowledge of God’, p. 398.
Kokkinakis v Greece (1994) 17 EHRR 397. (App no 14307/88, 25 May 1993.)
Kokkinakis 418 [31].
Lautsi 65 [15].
Chaplin v Royal Devon and Exeter NHS Foundation Trust [2010] ET 1702886/2009 (unreported).
The Coptic practice of tattooing the inside of one’s wrist to indicate membership of the religious community is a particularly clear example of the participation–function of the symbol. Our thanks to Rt. Rev. Michael Nazir-Ali for this example.
R. Trigg (2012) Equality, Freedom and Religion (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 47.
Lautsi v Italy [2009] ECHR 1901, (2010) 50 EHRR 42, 1064 [55]. (App no 30814/06, 3 November 2009.)
Lautsi (2009/10) 1059 [31].
Lautsi (2009/10) 1064 [55].
Lautsi (2009/10) 1063 [54]; this is a reference to Dahlab v Switzerland, which we shall explore further below.
Lautsi (2009/10) 1064 [56].
Lautsi (2011/2) 76 [36].
Lautsi (2011/2) 78 [42].
Dahlab v Switzerland ECHR 2001-V, no paragraphs. (App no 42393/98, 15 February 2001.)
Dahlab.
Dahlab.
Lautsi (2011/2) 87 [72].
Lautsi (2011/2) 87 [73]: ‘The Chamber found that, in the context of public education, crucifixes, which it was impossible not to notice in classrooms … could therefore be considered “powerful external symbols” within the meaning of the decision in Dahlab. The Grand Chamber does not agree with that approach.’
See D. McGoldrick (2011) ‘Religion in the European Public Square and in European Public Life — Crucifixes in the Classroom?’, Human Rights Law Review, 11.3, p. 484.
Lautsi (2011/2) 87 [72].
Concurring opinion of Judge Bonello, Lautsi (2011/2) 96 [O-II19].
Bonello, Lautsi (2011/2) 95 [O-II16].
Bonello, Lautsi (2011/2) 96 [O-II21].
Note, for example, the different ways in which the lack of evidence for indoctrination is treated in the two cases: in Dahlab, despite there being no evidence one way or the other, ‘it cannot be denied outright that the wearing of a headscarf might have some kind of proselytising effect’ (Dahlab); whereas in Lautsi (2011/2) the Grand Chamber states ‘[t]here is no evidence before the Court that the display of a religious symbol on classroom walls may have an influence on pupils and so it cannot reasonably be asserted that it does or does not have an effect on young persons. … The applicant’s subjective perception is not in itself sufficient to establish a breach of Art. 2 of Protocol No. 1’ (Lautsi (2011/2) 85 [66]).
Kenneth Burke’s insistence on the symbol as action is a helpful antidote here (see K. Burke (1967) The Philosophy of Symbolic Form: Studies in Symbolic Action, 2nd edn (Baton: Louisiana State University Press), esp. pp. 8–9).
One should also bear in mind Judge Power’s comments that not all symbols are active in the same way: symbols may’ speak volumes without, however, doing so in a coercive or in an indoctrinating manner’, Concurring Opinion of Judge Power, Lautsi (2011/2) 98 [O-III6].
R. Trigg (2007) Religion in Public Life: Must Faith Be Privatized? (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
Trigg, (2012) Equality, Freedom and Religion (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
Trigg, Equality, p. 8.
For examples of these arguments, see Trigg, Equality, pp. 14, 42.
Trigg, Equality, pp. 101–2. Like many others before him, he goes on to uncover deep historical roots behind this tendency in the law of human rights. It is, he contends, a consequence of Lockean understandings of religion forged in the context of Latitudinarian Anglicanism. See Trigg, Equality, pp. 100, 117.
See D. Boyarin (2004) Border Lines: The Partition of Judeao-Christianity (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press).
and the summary of his argument in D. Barber (2011) On Diaspora: Christianity, Religion, and Secularity (Eugene, OR: Cascade), pp. 91–6.
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© 2013 Daniel J. Hill and Daniel Whistler
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Hill, D.J., Whistler, D. (2013). The Participative Symbol. In: The Right to Wear Religious Symbols. Palgrave Pivot, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137354174_6
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