Abstract Objectivity: Richard J. Bernstein’s Critique of Hilary Putnam

Abstract

In 1992, the journal Social Research published a conceptual and historical account of the “Resurgence of American Pragmatism” that was taking place in a variety of philosophical circles.¹ Social Research is interdiscipli- nary across the sciences and humanities, and continues to be housed, not insignificantly from the perspective of the history of American prag- matism, at the New School for Social Research. In the article, Richard J. Bernstein articulated a narrative of American pragmatism’s “resur- gence” since its “nadir” after the rise of logical empiricism in the United States and England in the mid-twentieth century. The article carefully canvasses a variety of ways in which such American figures as Richard Rorty, Cornel West, and Hilary Putnam, and such international figures as Jürgen Habermas, Karl-Otto Apel, and Hans Joas have appropriated and extended pragmatic philosophical positions with respect to a wide range of contemporary intellectual and political disputes. Bernstein brings the figures of this resurgence into contact with some of the most pressing philosophical questions and topics as they were debated some 20 years ago, clarifying the ways in which the thought of the classical pragma- tists, Charles Sanders Peirce, George Herbert Mead, William James, and John Dewey influenced these thinkers, resurfaces in their work, and in many cases anticipates later debates concerning knowledge, rationality, and democracy. Bernstein forcefully argues that, for pragmatism, philo- sophical reflection not only “touches upon” ethical and political issues but is deeply committed to an understanding of philosophical ques- tioning and critique that is internal to making “differences that make a difference” in our moral and political lives.