Regulatory Capitalism, Accountability and Democracy

Abstract

Discussions of accountability in contemporary public life are commonly tied to notions of public power and democratic governance. A core narrative might suggest that public power is attributed to elected governments and legitimated, periodically, through elections. Within such a democratic system the accountability mechanism par excellence is the election in which politicians can be removed from or given power. From such a core narrative, a number of concerns flow. First, if we believe that elected governments find favour because of their election promises then we might expect parliaments to hold governments to account for keeping their promises. Second, notwithstanding the fact of elections, we might hold that certain meta norms, often enshrined in constitutional documents, are not capable of being changed within ordinary political and legislative processes, and seek to ensure that governments are held to account for complying with such norms, both through judicial review and other review mechanisms, for example through parliamentary scrutiny and bureaucratic oversight. Third, if the core source of legitimate public power is through democratic processes of election, we should be concerned that when public power is delegated by the political principals, for example through legislation, then the agents should be monitored and held to account for keeping within the legitimate scope of delegation.