Abstract
In the Maoist era, Chinese leaders had little need for foreign policy advice due to China’s limited involvement in the international community and to the ideological, personalistic, and top-down pattern of decisionmaking under Mao Zedong. The launching of Deng Xiaoping’s reform and opening-up policy in the late 1970s marked the beginning of a process of gradual transformation of Chinese foreign policy from ideology to pragmatism, and from self-exclusion and passivity to greater involvement and active participation in international affairs. The vigorous conduct of diplomacy with 171 countries with which China today has diplomatic ties and in numerous regional and international organizations, combined with the rapid expansion of Chinese interests around the globe, have exponentially increased the Chinese leadership’s need for information, analysis, and advice about the outside world to safeguard and advance Chinese national interests. One of the important means by which this need has been met is through the system of Chinese foreign policy research institutes.
“Under Hu Jintao’s leadership opinions have been solicited more Ufrequently. The government knows very well that diplomacy is increasingly complex and involves the media, NGOs, and think tanks. They understand the need to broaden contacts with foreigners and Chinese. Their resources are limited. They need to know about energy, Tibet, human rights, and climate change. So I am confident that this process will continue.”
— Leading Chinese scholar
Bonnie S. Glaser is a senior advisor for Asia and the Freeman Chair in China Studies at CSIS. Ms. Glaser is also a senior associate with the CSIS Pacifi c Forum and a consultant on East Asia for the US government. Prior to joining CSIS, she served as a consultant for various US government offices, including the Departments of Defense and State. Glaser has written extensively on Chinese threat perceptions and views on strategic environment, China’s foreign policy, Sino-US relations, US-China military ties, China assessments of the Korean Peninsula, and Chinese perspectives on missile defense and multilateral security in Asia. Her recently published articles include “Tensions Flare in the South China Sea” (CSIS Report, 2011) and “A Shifting Balance: Chinese Assessments of U.S. Power” (CSIS Report, 2011). She received her B.A. in political science from Boston University and M.A. in international economics and Chinese studies from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.
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Notes
Prior articles on Chinese think tanks include: the entire issue of The China Quarterly 171 (September 2002); Zhu Xufeng, “The Influence of the Think Tanks in the Chinese Policy Process,” Asian Survey 49, no. 2 (2009): 333–357; Zhu Xufeng, “China’s Think Tanks: Roles and Characteristics,” EAI Background Brief No. 306, October 19, 2006; Cheng Li, “China’s New Think Tanks: Where Officials, Entrepreneurs, and Scholars Interact,” China Leadership Monitor 29;
Evan S. Medeiros, “Agents of Influence: Assessing the Role of Chinese Foreign Policy Research Organizations After the 16th Party Congress,” in Andrew Scobell and Larry Wortzel (eds.), Civil-Military Change in China: Elites, Institutes, and Ideas After the 16th Party Congress (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, Army War College, 2004), 279–307; Thomas Bondiguel and Thierry Kellner, “The Impact of China’s Foreign Policy Think Tanks,” BICCS Asia Paper 5, no. 5 (2010);
He Li, “The Role of Think Tanks in Chinese Foreign Policy,” Problems of Post-Communism 49, no. 2 (March/April 2002): 33–43;
and Zhu Xufeng and Xue Lan, “Think Tanks in Transitional China,” Public Administration and Development 27 (2007): 452–464.
Shi Chunlai and Xu Jian, “Preventive Diplomacy Pertinent to the Asia-Pacific,” International Review 4 (July 1997). The “new security concept” was introduced in December 1997 at the Third CSCAP North Pacific Meeting by China’s Ambassador Shi Chunlai. See Alastair lain Johnston, “Socialization in International Institutions: The ASEAN Way and International Relations Theory,” in G. John Ikenberry and Michael Mastaduno (eds.), International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 129.
Bonnie Glaser and Evan Medeiros, “The Changing Ecology of Foreign Policymaking in China: The Ascension and Demise of the Theory of ‘Peaceful Rise’,” China Quarterly 190 (2007): 291–310.
Thomas Bondiguel and Thierry Kellner, “The Impact of China’s Foreign Policy Think Tanks,” BICCS Asia Paper 5, no. 5(2010): 22.
Thomas Bondiguel and Thierry Kellner, “The Impact of China’s Foreign Policy Think Tanks,” BICCS Asia Paper 5, no. 5(2010): 20–21.
In a survey conducted by Zhu Xufeng, nearly all think tanks received pishi fewer than five times annually. “The Influence of Think Tanks in the Chinese Policy Process,” Asian Survey 49, no. 2 (2009): 344.
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© 2012 The Asan Institute for Policy Studies
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Glaser, B.S. (2012). Chinese Foreign Policy Research Institutes and the Practice of Influence. In: Rozman, G. (eds) China’s Foreign Policy. Asan-Palgrave Macmillan Series. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137344076_5
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