Disillusionment and Dismay: How Chinese Netizens Think and Feel about the Two Koreas

  • Peter Hays Gries
Part of the Asan-Palgrave Macmillan Series book series (APMS)


North Korea’s military aggression is probably best explained by the leadership transition in Pyongyang. And China’s policy response was likely driven by “traditionalists” within the International Liaison Department of the Chinese Communist Party and conservatives within the People’s Liberation Army.1 But China’s 2010 behavior was deeply alarming to South Koreans expecting that increasing PRC–ROK economic interdependence and interpersonal interactions would lead to improved bilateral relations. Th e 2010 setback in bilateral relations raised a serious question in Seoul: how do Chinese feel and think about the two Koreas?


Foreign Policy Korean Peninsula Chinese Communist Party Soft Power Friendly Policy 
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© The Asan Institute for Policy Studies 2012

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  • Peter Hays Gries

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