China’s (North) Korea Policy: Misperception and Reality (An Independent Chinese Perspective on Sino-Korean Relations)

  • Chen Ping
Part of the Asan-Palgrave Macmillan Series book series (APMS)


Since the first North Korean nuclear crisis in the early 1990s, China has made strenuous efforts to facilitate dialogue and discussion aimed at defusing the crisis. It has dedicated itself to finding ways to negotiate a conclusive and multilateral solution to the most pressing security dilemma in Northeast Asia. China’s hosting of the Six-Party Talks (6PT) is the best demonstration of such efforts.


Korean Peninsula Diplomatic Relation North Korean Regime North Korean Nuclear Issue North Korean Leader 
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© The Asan Institute for Policy Studies 2012

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  • Chen Ping

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