Political Apologies and Categorical Apologies

Abstract

I Was Wrong: The Meanings of Apologies attempted to differentiate the central meanings provided by ‘categorical apologies’, a term I offered to stipulate a regulative ideal for acts of contrition.¹ That book also considered how these meanings map onto collective apologies, which added many layers of complexity to the discussion. Research for my forthcoming book on the role of apologies in legal contexts introduced additional complications. In both individual and collective harms, a pattern — subject to many disclaimers regarding cultural specificity — becomes evident. A victim suffers harm. She wants something like an apology. She may not have an exact sense of what a sufficient apology would entail, but something like a categorical apology motivates her: she wants to know what happened, she wants someone to admit wrongdoing, she doesn’t want to stand by while someone ‘gets away with’ violating a moral principle she cares about, she wants to be respected and recognised as wronged, she wants the wrongdoer to feel badly, she wants to know this isn’t going to happen again to her or anyone else and she wants the wrongdoer to take practical responsibility for redressing her injury. This chapter will identify a few of the questions I find most helpful to ask when evaluating the meanings provided by — and avoided by — political apologies.