Social Justice and Social Inclusion, 2005–2011

Abstract

The case of Russia under Putin shows that leaders may attempt to replace participation and representation with firm executive action, often citing the benefits of speed in passing policy changes and legislation. In practice, however, social welfare reform is poorly suited to top-down political processes, precisely because this policy sphere requires the responsiveness to social demands that can only come through democratic institutions. After 2008, the global recession weakened the Russian state’s ability to deliver social welfare improvements, and discontent over social welfare contributed to the growth of Russian protest. Putin’s social welfare reforms became institutionalized after 2006, but those reforms were a response to the early transition, and policies seemed frozen in the 1990s. As became clear during the presidency of Dmitrii Medvedev (2008–2012), the Russian government was slow to respond to new challenges that emerged under the mature post-communist regime. When the efforts of authoritarian regimes or incomplete democracies to improve social welfare fall short, opposition may figures point to shortcomings in social welfare in order to gain support for a more democratic order. Established to please one group (nationalists), authoritarian social policies may alienate another group (democrats).