Abstract
Security is at risk not only when states are weak, but also when major opponents can draw on precious resources to challenge the government. War economies that provide a continuous income to conflict parties are a major cause of sustained violence, and have become central to political and scientific debate. Armed conflict is resource-intense; if military groups fall short of income, the conflict is likely to end more quickly. Economic activities in war times can include the smuggling of weapons, goods, humans, or the rise of shadow economies (e.g. Andreas 2008). Moreover, economic greed causes conflicts (Collier and Hoeffler 2005). Yet, discussion of war economies most often refers to those economic activities that facilitate and sustain armed conflict (Collier 2003). In particular, resources that can be readily found on the surface of the earth, like alluvial diamonds, are often linked to high degrees of violence in recruiting labor, securing transport, and profits (Weinstein 2006). This chapter analyzes one initiative to cut off resources available to conflict parties, namely the case of governing so-called blood diamonds or conflict diamonds. These diamonds are an issue where the governance of non-state violence and crime are closely connected (Jojarth 2009: 182–6). The first measures to disrupt this trade were formulated in the late 1990s when diamonds were financing warfare in Angola and Sierra Leone.
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© 2013 Anja P. Jakobi
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Jakobi, A.P. (2013). Governing War Economies: Conflict Diamonds and the Kimberley Process. In: Jakobi, A.P., Wolf, K.D. (eds) The Transnational Governance of Violence and Crime. Governance and Limited Statehood. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137334428_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137334428_5
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