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Why Did the Nine Say ‘Yes’?

  • Eirini Karamouzi
Chapter
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Part of the Security, Conflict and Cooperation in the Contemporary World book series (SCCCW)

Abstract

Early European reactions to the news of the Greek application were overwhelmingly positive. Harold Wilson, Britain’s prime minister, expressed satisfaction at the Greek government’s European choice.1 The French president, Valery Giscard d’Estaing, commented: ‘we were the first to openly support the membership of Greece, entry of which would contribute positively to the development of the European construction’.2 The Bonn government followed suit, describing Greece’s decision to seek full membership of the EEC ‘as a further demonstration of the unbroken power of attraction exercised by the process of European unification’.3 In the same spirit, the Italian foreign minister, Mariano Rumor, sent his ‘warmest congratulations’ while his Dutch counterpart conveyed a similar welcome.4 The Irish side praised the Greek application as a historic event coming as it did a few days after the referendum in the UK.5

Keywords

Member State Foreign Minister Full Membership Association Agreement Greek Government 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Notes

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Copyright information

© Eirini Karamouzi 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  • Eirini Karamouzi
    • 1
  1. 1.University of SheffieldUK

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