Practicing and Preaching: The Psychology of Religious Thinking

Abstract

In Chapters 2 and 3, I argued that the CSR relies on a counterintuitive characterisation of religious representations, processed through domain-specific cognitive modules. However, it also takes the view that the modules responsible for processing religious representations do not operate exclusively for religious concepts. If the mind contains no innate religious function, then the CSR must also explain how minds acquire and transmit religious representations. In part, at least at a representational level, the answer has already been provided: the successful transmission of religious representations relies upon of a common cognitive receptivity, enhanced by memorable counterintuitive notions. Even so, the CSR account struggles to differentiate religious cognition from other culturally universal forms of cognition. In this chapter, I construct an argument around the psychology underpinning religious cognition in attempting to bolster the psychological plausibility of the CSR.