Mill’s Greek Ideal of Individuality

Abstract

In On Liberty, John Stuart Mill defends “a Greek ideal of selfdevelopment,” which apparently involves a mixture of two elements: “ ‘Pagan self-assertion’ is one of the elements of human worth, as well as ‘Christian self-denial’ “ (OL.iii.8).¹ This Greek ideal, he says, “blends with [...] the Platonic and Christian ideal of self-government” in so far as both ideals prescribe that individuals should voluntarily sacrifice their selfish concerns when necessary to obey moral rules of justice that distribute equal rights and correlative duties for the common good. Indeed, an individual should be forced, if necessary, to obey such rules of justice: “As much compression as is necessary to prevent the stronger specimens of human nature from encroaching on the rights of others, cannot be dispensed with” (OL.iii.9).² But the Greek ideal also includes an element of self-assertion and thus does not call for the individual to exhaust her entire life and conduct in obedience to putative moral rules, whether in the form of laws, customs, or dictates of conscience. For Mill, the Greek ideal supersedes the Platonic and Christian ideal, which decries self-assertion and tries to smother it with moral rules. He makes this clear when he holds up Pericles to exemplify the Greek ideal, and claims that Pericles lacks none of the virtues of John Knox, who exemplifies Christian self-sacrifice: “It may be better to be a John Knox than an Alcibiades, but it is better to be a Pericles than either; nor would a Pericles, if we had one in these days, be without anything good which belonged to John Knox” (OL.iii.8).³