Neutrality, Public Reason and Deliberative Democracy

Abstract

In this paper I wish to explore some broad trends and developments in recent political philosophy concerning the relation between neutrality, pluralism, deliberative democracy, public reason and legitimacy. Each of these concepts has been the subject of extensive analysis and debate. My objective is not to provide a detailed analysis of the vast literature in the field about these ideas and the controversies surrounding them. Rather I hope to establish two general claims about the relationship between these concepts. First, I argue that liberal neutrality cannot provide a satisfactory account of the distinction between public and non-public reasons as this pertains to the task of securing the kind of political legitimacy prized by some advocates of deliberative democracy. I will call this the futility of neutrality thesis. Second, I argue that a common Rawlsian characterization of public reason cannot live up to its promise of resolving important political issues while at the same time respecting the normative pluralism present in contemporary democratic communities. I will call this the hubris of public reason thesis. I shall begin by providing a brief overview of the philosophical terrain in which my arguments are situated. The depiction of various issues and debates I provide is, I think, both familiar and faithful to relevant developments in the field but since I am not offering a detailed intellectual history or an exegetical analysis of canonical texts, I shall pass over some details and fine grained distinctions that migh be relevant in other contexts.