Introduction

Abstract

The basic intuition supporting the ideal of political neutrality is that no exercise of political power can be legitimately justified solely by the reason that one way of life is intrinsically superior to all others. For a number of contemporary authors, this ideal of neutrality is the hallmark of liberalism. I’ll start by (1) describing the contemporary history of political neutrality. I then (2) distinguish three kinds of neutrality: neutrality of consequences, of aims, and of justifications. Then I look at (3) the object of neutrality: the most common view is that neutrality concerns ‘conceptions of the good.’ But what does this expression include exactly? Next, (4) I examine the scope of neutrality: the term ‘state neutrality’ is the most common designation of its scope, but what exactly does it encompass? I then (5) turn to the question of the justification of neutrality. Next I (6) examine the possibility of a convergence between the ideal of political neutrality and political perfectionism. Finally I will present a (7) summary of the chapters.