Abstract
As we saw in the last chapter, causalism locates the difference between intentional actions and tics in the causal-psychological history of the action. Teleological realists focus on the (putatively) irreducibly purposive nature of action to make the same distinction. The theories that we will consider in this chapter form a somewhat inchoate group. Their unity, such as it is, lies in their claim that intentional actions are, or are related to, an item called a volition or trying, which is irreducible to any other mental item.
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© 2015 Lilian O’Brien
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O’Brien, L. (2015). Volitionism and Trying Theories. In: Philosophy of Action. Palgrave Philosophy Today. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137317483_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137317483_3
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-0-230-23281-5
Online ISBN: 978-1-137-31748-3
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