Abstract
In Chapters 3 and 4, we considered some arguments for incompatibilism: the Consequence Argument (CA), the Sourcehood Argument (SA), Pereboom’s four-case argument (4CA), and Mele’s zygote argument. My own view is that these arguments are by no means conclusive – far from it – but, of course, not everyone agrees with that assessment. And so we come to incompatibilist views of freedom of the will.
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© 2013 Helen Beebee
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Beebee, H. (2013). What Does Acting Freely Require? Some Incompatibilist Views. In: Free Will. Palgrave Philosophy Today. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137316066_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137316066_5
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
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