Abstract
Why has the theory of judgement and proposition been central for the transition from British idealism to early analytic philosophy? In order to be able to answer this question, one has to know more about the theory of judgement in British idealism and the nineteenth century in general. Early analytic philosophy, that is, before 1905, consists of at least these aspects: logical realism, an atomistic theory of wholes and parts and a new method of analysis. I will focus here on logical realism as it is defended by Moore and Russell. Leaving the theory of wholes and parts and the new method for the next chapter, the central question here is: How did a new, British variant of logical realism, that is, a new theory of judgement and proposition, emerge from British idealism?
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© 2013 Maria van der Schaar
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van der Schaar, M. (2013). Judgement and the Emergence of Logical Realism in Britain. In: G.F. Stout and the Psychological Origins of Analytic Philosophy. History of Analytic Philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137315403_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137315403_2
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-32097-4
Online ISBN: 978-1-137-31540-3
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