Abstract
Even more popular than the opinion that human interests merit special concern relative to like animal interests is the belief that human lives are (objectively) more valuable than nonhuman animal lives; almost everyone — layperson and philosopher alike — accepts (VL). Of course, in virtue of its quite formal nature, such agreement, in and of itself, does not amount to very much, and indeed can mask rather significant differences. For those who either endorse or reject (VL), then, two reasonable demands can and should be cast.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Notes
T.M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Harvard University Press, 1998), p. 11.
Ruth Cigman, ‘Death, Misfortune, and Species Inequality’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 10 (1) (Winter 1980), pp. 47–64.
Mark Rowlands, Animals Like Us (Verso, 2002), chapter 4, pp. 70–97.
Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights (University of California Press, 1983), p. 314.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Copyright information
© 2015 Mark H. Bernstein
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Bernstein, M.H. (2015). On the Relative Unimportance of Human Life. In: The Moral Equality of Humans and Animals. The Palgrave Macmillan Animal Ethics Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137315250_2
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137315250_2
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-57659-3
Online ISBN: 978-1-137-31525-0
eBook Packages: Palgrave Religion & Philosophy CollectionPhilosophy and Religion (R0)