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Painful Art and the Limits of Well-Being

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Suffering Art Gladly

Abstract

In this chapter I ask what painful art can teach us about the nature and importance of human welfare. My goal is not so much to defend a new solution to the paradox of tragedy as it is to explore the implications of the kinds of solutions that I find attractive. Both nonhedonic compensatory theories and constitutive theories plausibly explain why people seek out painful art, but they have troublesome implications. On some narrow theories of well-being, they imply that painful art is bad for us. Accordingly, we may rightly wonder if it is rational for people to watch melodramas or to listen to love songs. One might think that we should generally avoid unpleasant works of art. This implication flirts with absurdity. I show how it can be avoided by making a distinction between well-being and worth.

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Authors
  1. Aaron Smuts
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Maryland, USA

    Jerrold Levinson

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© 2014 Aaron Smuts

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Smuts, A. (2014). Painful Art and the Limits of Well-Being. In: Levinson, J. (eds) Suffering Art Gladly. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137313713_7

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