Abstract
Chapters 3 and 4 argued that there is nothing inherently objectionable about epistemic paternalism, which thereby remains a viable option for coming to terms with the problems raised by our dual tendency for bias and overconfidence. In order to provide a defence of epistemic paternalism, however, it is not sufficient to show that epistemic paternalism is a viable candidate, in that it is not the case that we are never justified in practising such paternalism. It also needs to be shown that there are situations in which we either are or would be justified in practising epistemic paternalism. In order to show that, however, we first need to say something about the conditions under which we are or would be justified in practicing such paternalism. That is the focus of this chapter.
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© 2013 Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij
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Ahlstrom-Vij, K. (2013). Justifying Epistemic Paternalism. In: Epistemic Paternalism. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137313171_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137313171_6
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-34511-3
Online ISBN: 978-1-137-31317-1
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