Sovereignty, (Ir)responsibility and Intervention

Abstract

Who is responsible to whom and for what under the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP)? And on what is this responsibility based? Can we meaningfully speak of responsibilities in the context of civil crises, revolutions or wars? In Chapter 1, I sought to clarify the primary differences between the de jure and de facto definitions of sovereignty. From that starting point, I have advanced the claim that the discussion of the RtoP has tended to revolve around a purely normative (de jure) understanding of sovereignty and that considerations of de facto power have largely been absent. The question that must now be considered is whether a critique of the RtoP from a de facto sovereignty perspective can extend the preceding critique of the attempt to institutionalize the RtoP norm. In particular, the question must be asked whether a de facto sovereign, deciding upon the exception, can be understood to have ‘responsibilities’ in any meaningful sense. Even more to the point, the question lies in whether the decisive sovereign can be held to account by another for irresponsible action in a crisis situation. If such a sense of responsibility lays the groundwork for intervention for human protection purposes, how is the force that carries out the intervention to be held to account?