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Abstract

Recent public opinion surveys show that the South Korean public has become either unaware of the 1995 Murayama Statement or confused about its core message in the absence of concrete measures by the Japanese government that would have converted the words of Japan’s apology for its colonial past into policy measures. But rejecting the Murayama Statement’s value as an important official document on historical reconciliation and justice would trap the political elites and the public in both South Korea and Japan in their own negative self-fulfilling prophecies, leading them to believe that it was a mistake to put their trust in the other government making genuine efforts to settle historical issues.

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Notes

  1. The preamble states: “The Japanese side is keenly conscious of the responsibility for the serious damage that Japan caused in the past to the Chinese people through times of war, nd deeply reproaches itself ” (Shimokoji 2003).

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  2. “In the past, Japan, through its colonial rule and aggression, caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of many countries, particularly to those of Asian nations. Sincerely facing these facts of history, I once again express my feelings of deep remorse and heartfelt apology, and also express the feelings of mourning for all victims, both at home and abroad, in the war. I am determined not to allow the lessons of that horrible war to erode, and to contribute to the peace and prosperity of the world without ever again waging a war” (official translation of the apology by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, quoted in Dudden 2006, 7).

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  3. See also Law No. 144 (December 17, 1965): Law Concerning Measures on Property Right of the Republic of Korea, Etc., To Be Taken for the Enforcement of Article II of the Agreement on the Settlement of Problems Concerning Property and Claims and on the Economic Co-operation between Japan and the Republic of Korea (United Nations 1972). On November 5, 1965, the foreign minister of Japan, Noriyuki Shiina, stated that “through signing the treaty, only the right to diplomatic protection became null and void” (Paekeun Park 2008, 177).

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  4. During the 1990s, ROK foreign ministers periodically confirmed that this is indeed the official position of the ROK government. Former minister Gong Ro-Myung and minister Lee Jungbin reiterated this point in press conferences on September 20, 1995, and on June 24, 2000, respectively. On August 30, 2011, the ROK Constitutional Court ruled that it is the constitutional duty of the South Korean government to support private persons’ claims to compensation from a foreign state (Case 2006 Heonma, 788).

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  5. See the statement issued by Kazuhiko Togo, then director-general of the Treaties Bureau and of the European Affairs Department, at the 140th session of the Diet on March 4, 1997. Article 29, Section 1 of the Constitution of Japan concerns the protection of property rights (Yoo 2010).

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  6. am grateful to Kazuhiko Togo for informing me of these examples.

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  7. The Asan Monthly Opinion Survey (2012) conducted by the Asan Institute for Policy Studies employed the random digit dialing method for mobile phones and elicited responses from 1,000 South Koreans over the age of 19. It is a nationwide survey. The poll results have a 95 percent confidence level and a ±3.1 percent margin of error.

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  8. It should be noted that the Dokdo issue has been the most popular indicator for measuring the sincerity of Japan’s intention to settle the past. The South Korean public and government tend to tie historical and territorial issues together when measuring Japan’s denial of history. For instance, in protest over Japanese prime minister Junichiro Koizumi’s repeated visits to the Yasukuni Shrine and the passage of an ordinance in March 2005 by the Shimane prefecture designating February 22 “Takeshima Day,” the Roh Moo Hyun government in South Korea declared the “New Doctrine,” which later guided Korea’s Japan policy in its official announcement by the National Security Council Standing Committee on March 15, 2005 (Bong 2010, 1).

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  9. As of mid-November 2011, the death toll from the Triple Crises stands at nearly 16,000, with more than 3,600 missing, and nearly 6,000 injured (Kubota 2012). The World Bank (The Economist 2011) estimates that the total damage caused by the crises could be as high as US$235 billion, or approximately 4 percent of Japan’s GDP.

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Kazuhiko Togo

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© 2013 Kazuhiko Togo

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Bong, Y.D. (2013). In Search of the Perfect Apology: Korea’s Responses to the Murayama Statement. In: Togo, K. (eds) Japan and Reconciliation in Post-war Asia: The Murayama Statement and Its Implications. Palgrave Pivot, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137301239_3

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