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Political Apology in Sino-Japanese Relations: The Murayama Statement and Its Receptions in China

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Japan and Reconciliation in Post-war Asia: The Murayama Statement and Its Implications

Abstract

The 1995 statement by Japan’s socialist prime minister Tomiichi Murayama, made at a time when history issues had become a major problem between Japan and its neighbors, was welcomed in China. However, it did not constitute a turning point, largely because subsequent statements and actions by some Japanese politicians seemed to contradict its spirit. Although the Murayama Statement has been upheld by all subsequent cabinets in Japan, its efficacy in managing Sino-Japanese relations was limited until the Chinese government and analysts began searching for a new approach to Japan policy to bring the escalating history problems under control. Since 2006, the spirit of the Murayama Statement, coupled with a tacit understanding concerning mutual self-restraint, has become a minimum condition for China to contain its history problems with Japan.

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Notes

  1. Here the theory of elite myth-making may imply elites cynically fabricating myths out of thin air rather than themselves embracing such myths as their worldview.

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  2. Japanese officials or politicians who have evoked the Murayama Statement during their visits to China include foreign minister Makiko Tanaka (2001), head of the Conservative Party Takeshi Noda (2001), foreign minister Junko Kawaguchi (2002), and head of the Democratic Party Seiji Maehara (2005). Controversial statements have included those by Seisuke Okuno (1996), Seiroku Kajiyama (1997), and Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori (2000). A Japanese Foreign Ministry spokesman also evoked the Murayama Statement after the Osaka International Peace Center allowed a meeting by neonationalists denying the Nanjing Massacre in 2000.

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  3. These include the Joint Statement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on Comprehensive Promotion of a “Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests” (2008).

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  4. The Chinese government made a similar comment when Prime Minister Taro Aso sent potted plants to the Yasukuni Shrine in April 2009.

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  5. The Chinese government also remained restrained when Yoshihiko Noda, then running for president of the ruling Democratic Party of Japan, commented that convicted Class A war criminals were not considered guilty under Japanese domestic law.

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Authors
  1. Daqing Yang
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Kazuhiko Togo

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© 2013 Kazuhiko Togo

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Yang, D. (2013). Political Apology in Sino-Japanese Relations: The Murayama Statement and Its Receptions in China. In: Togo, K. (eds) Japan and Reconciliation in Post-war Asia: The Murayama Statement and Its Implications. Palgrave Pivot, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137301239_2

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