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Elections and Beyond: Democratization, Democratic Consolidation, or What?

  • Mahmoud Hamad
  • Khalil al-Anani
Chapter
  • 270 Downloads
Part of the Elections, Voting, Technology book series (EVT)

Abstract

It was once noted correctly that “there are two predictable, and nearly always mistaken, responses to any great international upheaval: one to say that everything has changed; the other is to say that nothing has changed.”1 Many expected in the euphoria that followed the Arab Spring a quick and relatively easy democratic transformation. Followers of this logic maintained that jettisoning the overbearing leviathans was the hardest step in the democratization process and anything else would be relatively easier. Focusing on the enduring legacy of authoritarianism and the increasing economic, social, and sectarian difficulties, others expressed grave doubts about the ability of Arab institutions and masses to satisfy the conditions of democratic transition and move toward democratic consolidation. At least in the short run neither scenario seems to be accurate. Emerging political systems are embarking on political transition that may or may not reach democratic consolidation.

Keywords

Middle East Comparative International Development Arab World Democratic Transition Political Skill 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Notes

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© Mahmoud Hamad and Khalil al-Anani 2014

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  • Mahmoud Hamad
  • Khalil al-Anani

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