Skip to main content

Due Process and the World Bank’s Inspection Panel

  • Chapter
Energy & Ethics

Part of the book series: Energy, Climate and the Environment ((ECE))

Abstract

Due process — the idea that everyone deserves equal protection under the law, and should be guaranteed a basic list of human rights — is one of the oldest justice concerns, dating all the way back to antiquity and culminating in the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights, which virtually every country signed in December 1948. Yet many large, international energy companies have consistently failed to respect human rights for their workers as well as the communities that they operate in. Indeed, oil and gas suppliers have depended on private security firms to protect their operations and suppress dissent. In Indonesia, Myanmar, Nigeria, and Peru, some firms selling oil and gas have denied free speech, employed torture, supported slavery and forced labor, sanctioned extrajudicial killings, and ordered executions. Shell gave guns to Nigerian security forces, and Chevron provided aid, helicopters, and pilots to an armed group that then gunned down nonviolent protestors on an oil drilling platform. British Petroleum, ExxonMobil, ConocoPhillips, and other companies offer daily “security briefings” for mercenaries and supply vehicles, arms, food, and medicine to soldiers and police throughout the world.1

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 89.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 119.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Notes

  1. Sovacool, B. The Dirty Energy Dilemma (Westport: Praegar; 2008, p. 134).

    Google Scholar 

  2. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and International Development Association, Accountability at the World Bank: The Inspection Panel at 15 Years (Washington, DC: World Bank Group; 2009).

    Google Scholar 

  3. Ballard, C. and G. Banks, “Resource Wars: The Anthropology of Mining,” Annual Review ofAnthropology 2003; 32: 305.

    Google Scholar 

  4. The Guardian, “Shell Pays Out $15.5m Over Saro-Wiwa Killing,” June 9, 2009.

    Google Scholar 

  5. Taylor, I. “China’s Oil Diplomacy in Africa,” International Affairs 2006; 82(5): 937–59.

    Google Scholar 

  6. Watts, M. J. “Righteous Oil: Human Rights, The Oil Complex, and Corporate Social Responsibility,” Annual Review ofEnvironment and Resources 2005; 30: 373–407.

    Google Scholar 

  7. Sovacool, B. K. and L. C. Bulan. “Behind an Ambitious Megaproject in Asia: The History and Implications of the Bakun Hydroelectric Dam in Borneo,” Energy Policy 2011; 39(9): 4842–59.

    Google Scholar 

  8. Sovacool, B. K. and L. C. Bulan. “Energy Security and Hydropower Development in Malaysia: The Drivers and Challenges facing the Sarawak Corridor of Renewable Energy (SCORE),” Renewable Energy 2012; 40(1): 113–29; Sovacool, B. K. and L. C. Bulan. “Meeting Targets, Missing People: The Energy Security Implications of the Sarawak Corridor of Renewable Energy (SCORE) in Malaysia,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 2011; 33(1): 56–82; Sovacool, B. K. and L. C. Bulan. “They’ll Be Dammed: The Sustainability Implications of the Sarawak Corridor of Renewable Energy (SCORE) in Malaysia,” Sustainability Science (in press, 2012).

    Google Scholar 

  9. Ballard, C. Human Rights and the Mining Sector in Indonesia: A Baseline Study (International Institute for Environment and Development; October 2001).

    Google Scholar 

  10. Myers, S. L. “Lament for a Once-Lovely Waterway,” New York Times, June 12, 2010; Myers, S. L. “Vital River is Withering, and Iraq Has No Answer,” New York Times, June 12, 2010.

    Google Scholar 

  11. Downing, T. E. Avoiding New Poverty: Mining-Inducted Displacement and Resettlement (International Institute for Environment and Development; April, 2002).

    Google Scholar 

  12. Hunter, D. “Using the World Bank Inspection Panel to Defend the Interests of Project-Affected People,” Chicago Journal of Intemational Law 2003; 4: 201–11.

    Google Scholar 

  13. Hornberger, J. G. The Bill of Rights: Due Process of Law (Future of Freedom Foundation; 2005).

    Google Scholar 

  14. Ash, J. “New Nuclear Energy, Risk, and Justice: Regulatory Strategies for an Era ofLimited Trust,” Politics & Policy 2010; 38(2): 255–84; Adger, W. N., J. Paavola and S. Huq, “Toward Justice in Adaptation to Climate Change,” in Adger, W. N., J. Paavola, S. Huq., and M. J. Mace (Eds) Fairness in Adaptation to Climate Change (Cambridge: MIT Press; 2006, pp. 1–19); Barry, B. Justice as Impartiality (Oxford: Oxford University Press; 1995); Salazar, D. J. and D. K. Alper, “Justice and Environmentalisms in the British Columbia and U.S. Pacific Northwest Environmental Movements,” Society & Natural Resources 2011; 24(8): 767–84.

    Google Scholar 

  15. Weston, B. H., “Climate Change and Intergenerational Justice: Foundational Reflections,” Vermont Journal of Environmental Law 2008; 9: 375–430; see also Weston, B. H. and T. Bach, Climate Change and Intergenerational Justice: Present law, Future Law (Vermont Law School; 2008).

    Google Scholar 

  16. Anton, D. K. and D. L. Shelton, Environmental Protection and Human Rights (New York: Cambridge University Press; 2011, p. 431).

    Google Scholar 

  17. Goodland, R. “Free, Prior and Informed Consent and the World Bank Group,” Sustainable Development Law & Policy 2004; 4(2): 66–74; UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (UNPFII). Report of the International Workshop on Methodologies Regarding Free Prior and Informed Consent and Indigenous Peoples. Document E/C.19/2005/3, submitted to the Fourth Session of UNPFII, May 16–17, 2005.

    Google Scholar 

  18. Finer, M., C. N. Jenkins, S. L. Pimm, B. Keane and C. Ross. “Oil and Gas Projects in the Western Amazon: Threats to Wilderness, Biodiversity, and Indigenous Peoples,” PLoS One 2008; 3(8): 1–9.

    Google Scholar 

  19. Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Working Group on Indigenous Populations, 22nd session, 19–13 July, 2004, p. 5.

    Google Scholar 

  20. Colchester, M. and M. F. Ferrari. Making FPIC — Free, Prior and Informed Consent — Work: Challenges and Prospects for Indigenous People (Forest Peoples Project, 4 June, 2007); United Nations. Free Prior Informed Consent and Beyond: The Experience of IFAD (Geneva: PFII/2005/WS.2/10; 2005); Salazar, D. J. and D. K. Alper, “Justice and Environmentalisms in the British Columbia and U.S. Pacific Northwest Environmental Movements,” Society & Natural Resources 2011; 24(8): 767–84.

    Google Scholar 

  21. The following paragraphs draw substantially from Dunkerton, K. J. “The World Bank Inspection Panel and its Affect on Lending Accountability to Citizens of Borrowing Nations,” University of Baltimore Journal of Environmental Law 1995; 5: 226–61; as well as The World Bank. Annual Report 2012 (Washington, DC: World Bank Group).

    Google Scholar 

  22. Clark, D. L. A Citizens Guide to the World Bank Inspection Panel (Washington, DC: Center for International Environmental Law; October, 1999).

    Google Scholar 

  23. The World Bank. Annual Report 2012 (Washington, DC: World Bank Group).

    Google Scholar 

  24. Woods, N. “The Challenge of Good Governance for the IMF and the World Bank Themselves,” World Development 2000; 28(5): 823–41.

    Google Scholar 

  25. See http://www.worldbank.org/ibrd (accessed February 1, 2013).

  26. World Bank Group. “Energy Data.” available from http://go.worldbank.org/ERF9QNT660 (accessed: October, 2012).

  27. Pincus, J. R. and J. A. Winters, Reinventing the World Bank (Ithaca and New York: Cornell University Press; 2002); World Bank. World Bank Group Work in Low-Income Countries Under Stress: A Task Force Report (Washington, DC: World Bank; 2002).

    Google Scholar 

  28. World Bank Inspection Panel. The Inspection Panel: Annual Report July 1 2010 to June 20, 2011 (Washington, DC: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank Group; 2011).

    Google Scholar 

  29. For more on the history of the formation of the IP, readers should peruse The World Bank. The World Banklnspection Panel: TheFirstFour Years (1994–1998) (Washington, DC: World Bank Group; 1998); Bradlow, D. D. and S. Schlemmer-Schulte. “The World Bank’s New Inspection Panel: A Constructive Step in the Transformation of the International Legal Order,” Heidelberg Journal of Law 1994; 392–415; Bradlow, D. D. “International Organizations and Private Complaints: The Case of the World Bank Inspection Panel,” Virginia Journal oflnternational Law 1994; 34(3): 555–613; Shihata, I. F. I. The World Bank Inspection Panel (New York: Oxford University Press; 1994).

    Google Scholar 

  30. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and International Development Association. Accountability at the World Bank: The Inspection Panel at 15 Years (Washington, DC: World Bank Group; 2009).

    Google Scholar 

  31. Clark, D. “Understanding the World Bank Inspection Panel,” in D. Clark, J. Fox and K. Treakle (Eds) Demanding Accountability: Civil Society Claims and the World Bank Inspection Panel (New York: Rowman and Littlefield; 2003, pp. 1–24).

    Google Scholar 

  32. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the World Bank. Accountability at the World Bank: The Inspection Panel 10 Years On (Washington, DC: World Bank Group; 2003).

    Google Scholar 

  33. Fox, J. “Introduction: Framing the Inspection Panel,” in D. Clark, J. Fox and K. Treakle (Eds) Demanding Accountability: Civil Society Claims and the World Bank Inspection Panel (New York: Rowman and Littlefield; 2003, pp. xi-xxxi).

    Google Scholar 

  34. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and International Development Association (2009).

    Google Scholar 

  35. Werlin, H. H. “Helping Poor Countries: A Critique of the World Bank,” Orbis 2003; Fall: 757–65.

    Google Scholar 

  36. Clark, D. “Understanding the World Bank Inspection Panel,” in D. Clark, J. Fox and K. Treakle (Eds) Demanding Accountability: Civil Society Claims and the World Bank Inspection Panel (New York: Rowman and Littlefield; 2003, pp. 1–24).

    Google Scholar 

  37. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and International Development Association. Accountability at the World Bank: The Inspection Panel at 15 Years (Washington, DC: World Bank Group; 2009).

    Google Scholar 

  38. Ibid.

    Google Scholar 

  39. World Bank Inspection Panel. The Inspection Panel: Annual Report July 1 2010 to June 20, 2011 (Washington, DC: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank Group; 2011).

    Google Scholar 

  40. Bradlow, D. D. “International Organizations and Private Complaints: The Case of the WorldBank Inspection Panel,” Virginia Journal oflnternational Law 1993–1994; 34: 553–614.

    Google Scholar 

  41. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and International Development Association (2009).

    Google Scholar 

  42. Utzinger, J., K. Wyss, D. D. Moto, N. D. Yemadji, M. Tanner and B. H. Singer. “Assessing Health Impacts of the Chad-Cameroon Petroleum Development and Pipeline Project: Challenges and a Way Forward,” EnvironmentallmpactAssessment Review 2005; 25: 63–93.

    Google Scholar 

  43. Clark, D., “Understanding the World Bank Inspection Panel,” in D. Clark, J. Fox and K. Treakle (Eds) Demanding Accountability: Civil Society Claims and the World Bank Inspection Panel (New York: Rowman and Littlefield; 2003, pp. 1–24).

    Google Scholar 

  44. Treakle, K., J. Fox and D. Clark, “Lessons Learned,” in D. Clark, J. Fox and K. Treakle (Eds) Demanding Accountability: Civil Society Claims and the World Bank Inspection Panel (New York: Rowman and Littlefield; 2003, pp. 247–77).

    Google Scholar 

  45. Bradlow, D. D. “International Organizations and Private Complaints: The Case of the WorldBank Inspection Panel,” Virginia Journal ofInternational Law 1993–1994; 34: 553–614.

    Google Scholar 

  46. Clark, D. L. A Citizens Guide to the World Bank Inspection Panel (Washington, DC: Center for International Environmental Law; October, 1999).

    Google Scholar 

  47. Treakie, K., J. Fox and D. Clark, “Lessons Learned,” in D. Clark, J. Fox and K. Treakle (Eds) Demanding Accountability: Civil Society Claims and the World Bank Inspection Panel (New York: Rowman and Littlefield; 2003, pp. 247–77).

    Google Scholar 

  48. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and International Development Association (2009).

    Google Scholar 

  49. Udall, L. World Bank Inspection Panel (Contributing Paper 126 to the World Commission on Dams, 2000).

    Google Scholar 

  50. Fox, J. and K. Treakle, “Concluding Propositions,” in D. Clark, J. Fox and K. Treakle (Eds) Demanding Accountability: Civil Society Claims and the World Bank Inspection Panel (New York: Rowman and Littlefield; 2003, pp. 279–86).

    Google Scholar 

  51. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and International Development Association (2009).

    Google Scholar 

  52. Kim, E. T., “Unlikely Formation: Contesting and Advancing Asian/African ‘Indigenousness’ at the World Bank Inspection Panel,” New York University Journal ofInternational Law and Policy 2008–2009; 41: 131–58.

    Google Scholar 

  53. Treakle, K., J. Fox and D. Clark, “Lessons Learned,” in D. Clark, J. Fox and K. Treakle (Eds) Demanding Accountability: Civil Society Claims and the World Bank Inspection Panel (New York: Rowman and Littlefield; 2003, pp. 247–77).

    Google Scholar 

  54. Guarascio, F. “International Development Banks Remain Opaque Institutions,” October 1, 2012, available at http://www.publicserviceeurope.com/article/2523/international-development-banks-remain-opaque-institutions#ixzz29 V4bbgGy (accessed February 1, 2013).

  55. European Investment Bank. Complaints Mechanism Operating Procedures (Brussels: EIB; April 2012).

    Google Scholar 

  56. Boisson de Chazournes, L. “Public Participation in Decision-Making: The World Bank Inspection Panel,” Studies in Transnational Legal Policy 1999; 31: 84–94.

    Google Scholar 

  57. Herz, S. and A. Perrault. Bringing Human Rights Claims to the World Bank Inspection Panel (Washington, DC: Center for International Environmental Law, Bank Information Center, and the International Accountability Project; October, 2009).

    Google Scholar 

  58. Treakle, K., J. Fox and D. Clark, “Lessons Learned,” in D. Clark, J. Fox and K. Treakle (Eds) Demanding Accountability: Civil Society Claims and the World Bank Inspection Panel (New York: Rowman and Littlefield; 2003, pp. 247–77).

    Google Scholar 

  59. Ibid.

    Google Scholar 

  60. Ibid.

    Google Scholar 

  61. Dunkerton, K. J. “The World Bank Inspection Panel and its Affect on Lending Accountability to Citizens of Borrowing Nations,” University ofBaltimore Journal of Environmental Law 1995; 5: 226–61.

    Google Scholar 

  62. Clark, D. L. A Citizens Guide to the World Bank Inspection Panel (Washington, DC: Center for International Environmental Law; October, 1999).

    Google Scholar 

  63. Udall, L. World Bank Inspection Panel (Contributing Paper 126 to the World Commission on Dams, 2000).

    Google Scholar 

  64. Carrascott, E. R. and A. K. Guernsey. “The World Bank’s Inspection Panel: Promoting True Accountability Through Arbitration,” Cornell International Law Journal 2008; 41: 577–629.

    Google Scholar 

  65. Ibid.

    Google Scholar 

  66. Ibid.

    Google Scholar 

  67. Ibid.

    Google Scholar 

  68. Hunter, D. “Using the World Bank Inspection Panel to Defend the Interests of Project-Affected People,” Chicago Journal ofInternational Law 2003; 4: 201–11.

    Google Scholar 

  69. Clark, D. “Understanding the World Bank Inspection Panel,” in D. Clark, J. Fox, and K. Treakle (Eds) Demanding Accountability: Civil Society Claims and the World Bank Inspection Panel (New York: Rowman and Littlefield; 2003, pp. 1–24).

    Google Scholar 

  70. Dunkerton, K. J. “The World Bank Inspection Panel and its Affect on Lending Accountability to Citizens of Borrowing Nations,” University ofBaltimore Journal of Environmental Law 1995; 5: 226–61.

    Google Scholar 

  71. Carrascott, E. R. and A. K. Guernsey. “The World Bank’s Inspection Panel: Promoting True Accountability Through Arbitration,” Cornell International Law Journal 2008; 41: 5 7 7–629.

    Google Scholar 

  72. Clark, D. “Understanding the World Bank Inspection Panel,” in D. Clark, J. Fox and K. Treakle (Eds) Demanding Accountability: Civil Society Claims and the World Bank Inspection Panel (New York: Rowman and Littlefield,; 2003, pp. 1–24).

    Google Scholar 

  73. Ibid.

    Google Scholar 

  74. Ibid.

    Google Scholar 

  75. Ibid.

    Google Scholar 

  76. World Bank Inspection Panel, The Inspection Panel: Annual Report July 1 2010 to June 20, 2011 (Washington, DC: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank Group; 2011).

    Google Scholar 

  77. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and International Development Association (2009).

    Google Scholar 

  78. Clark, D. “Singrauli: An Unfulfilled Struggle for Justice,” in D. Clark, J. Fox and K. Treakle (Eds) Demanding Accountability: Civil Society Claims and the World Bank Inspection Panel (New York: Rowman and Littlefield; 2003, pp. 167–90).

    Google Scholar 

  79. Clark, D. “Understanding the World Bank Inspection Panel,” in D. Clark, J. Fox and K. Treakle (Eds) Demanding Accountability: Civil Society Claims and the World Bank Inspection Panel (New York: Rowman and Littlefield,; 2003, pp. 1–24).

    Google Scholar 

  80. Werlin, H. H. “Helping Poor Countries: A Critique of the World Bank,” Orbis 2003; Fall: 75 7–65.

    Google Scholar 

  81. Woods, N. “The Challenge of Good Governance for the IMF and the World Bank Themselves,” World Development 2000; 28(5): 823–41.

    Google Scholar 

  82. Goldman, M. “Imperial Science, Imperial Nature: Environmental Knowledge for the World (Bank),” in S. Jasanoff and M. Long Martello (Eds) Earthly Politics: Local and Global in Environmental Governance (Cambridge: MIT Press; 2004, pp. 55–80); see also Goldman, M. Imperial Nature: The World Bank and Struggles for Social Justice in the Age of Globalization (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press; 2005).

    Google Scholar 

  83. Long Martello, M. and S. Jasanoff, “Globalization and Environmental Governance,” in S. Jasanoff and M. Long Martello (Eds) Earthly Politics: Local and Global in Environmental Governance (Cambridge: MIT Press; 2004, pp. 1–29).

    Google Scholar 

  84. Carrascott, E. R. and A. K. Guernsey, “The World Bank’s Inspection Panel: Promoting True Accountability Through Arbitration,” Cornell International Law Journal 2008; 41: 5 7 7–629.

    Google Scholar 

  85. Nelson, P. J. “Transparency Mechanisms at the Multilateral Development Banks,” World Development 2001; 29(11): 1835–47.

    Google Scholar 

  86. Hunter, D. “Using the World Bank Inspection Panel to Defend the Interests of Project-Affected People,” Chicago Journal of International Law 2003; 4: 201–11.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Copyright information

© 2013 Benjamin K. Sovacool

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Sovacool, B.K. (2013). Due Process and the World Bank’s Inspection Panel. In: Energy & Ethics. Energy, Climate and the Environment. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137298669_4

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics