Introduction

Abstract

Regime dynamics in the Middle East and North Africa have attracted much attention from scholars and practitioners alike over the past two decades, in particular since the events of 2011. The wave of popular protest that has swept across the region during the ‘Arab Spring’ has created new hope for democratic change, promising finally to overcome the ‘persistence’ of authoritarianism (Albrecht and Schlumberger 2004; Bellin 2012; Brynen et al. 2012; Hinnebusch 2006). At the same time, it has highlighted the shortcomings of international democracy promotion efforts vis-à-vis authoritarian regimes in the past. Observers agree that international democracy promotion has contributed little to the emergence or outcome of protest movements throughout the region (Perthes 2011; Schumacher 2011). The European Union (EU) was among those external actors to admit its failure in promoting democracy and human rights in Euro-Mediterranean relations in early 2011 (Dennison 2013; Teti 2012; Teti et al. 2013). Following a partnership-based approach, it had sought the active cooperation of incumbent regimes in implementing political dialogue, democracy assistance, and political conditionality since the early 1990s. Yet it is not at all evident why the ruling elites should voluntarily engage in activities geared towards regime change or transformation. Indeed, a closer look at the patterns of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation on democracy and human rights prior to the Arab Spring suggests that a number of authoritarian regimes were able to align the EU’s offer for cooperation with their strategies for regime survival.