Abstract
There are instances in which nuclear donor states permissively allow recipients to build up either significant opaque nuclear arsenals or nuclear manufacturing bases that permit them to weaponize during a future contingency. The logic for these policies is based on soft balancing, where instead of directly challenging an adversary, states create the conditions for proxy states to strengthen themselves. The problem with soft sharing is its detection and attribution. In particular, the US gave selected strategically important states including Japan, Israel and India privileged access to missiles and nuclear weapons-related technology. The Soviet Union and Russia have pursued similar permissive policies with regard to Iran and North Korea. The US and China continue to soft share with their respective proxy states in Pakistan and India.
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© 2014 Julian Schofield
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Schofield, J. (2014). Nuclear Sharing and Pakistan, North Korea and Iran. In: Strategic Nuclear Sharing. Global Issues Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137298454_12
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137298454_12
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