Abstract
Chapter 2 focused on the ontological puzzles raised by theoretical modelling. We will now turn to the problem of scientific representation. First, we will see how the make-believe view may be used to offer an account of representation which meets the criteria set out in Chapter 1 (Section 3.1). This account will draw a parallel between scientific models and works of fiction. In Section 3.2, we will pause to consider some objections to this comparison. Finally, in Section 3.3, we will focus on a type of model that presents problems for theories of scientific representation. These are models which represent no actual, concrete object. As we will see, unlike existing accounts, the make-believe view is able to make sense of these models.
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© 2012 Adam Toon
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Toon, A. (2012). How Models Represent. In: Models as Make-Believe. New Directions in the Philosophy of Science. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137292230_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137292230_4
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-33687-6
Online ISBN: 978-1-137-29223-0
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