Abstract
The neoclassical synthesis’ inability to explain the behaviour of credit resulted in monetary policy generating false signals for investors. These false signals led to large and unexpected losses for the world’s pension schemes. As Stiglitz and Minsky argued, credit is external to general equilibrium because credit markets do not clear and are inherently unstable. Moreover, their analysis highlighted two of the characteristics of credit bubbles that drive this instability. Excess business profits are a critical factor in driving increased credit expansion as investors look to continue to increase the rate of profit growth. This increased level of business profits then helps to drive down the cost of capital due to lower expected default rates, thus providing the fuel for further credit expansion. However, the models that have been constructed to identify credit bubbles have generally relied on price stability to provide the framework for such an identification. Indeed, Minsky based his model on Fisher, thus requiring a rise in the general price level and deviation from equilibrium to signal the existence of a credit bubble. Furthermore, this model has been widely popularised via Kindleberger in his ground-breaking book on business cycles and bubbles.2 Hence it is perhaps unsurprising that the majority of investors and central bankers in the summer of 2007 did not believe that the rise in asset prices was unsustainable as inflation remained subdued.
Theories that explain the trade cycle in terms of fluctuations in the general price level must be rejected not only because they fail to show why the monetary factor disturbs the general equilibrium, but also because their fundamental hypothesis is, from a theoretical standpoint, every bit as naive as that of those theories which entirely neglect the influence of money.
Friedrich Hayek1
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Notes
F. Hayek (1966) Monetary Theory and the Trade Cycle (Augustus M. Kelley), p. 106.
C. Kindleberger and R. Aliber (2011) Manias, Panics and Crashes (Palgrave Macmillan); See Chapter 2.
E. Mendoza and M. Terrones (2008) ‘An Anatomy of Credit Booms’, www.federalreserve.org
M. Desai (1995) ‘Kaldor between Hayek and Keynes, or Did Nicky Kill Capital Theory?’ in M. Desai, Macroeconomics and Monetary Theory: The Selected Essays of Meghnad Desai (Elgar), p. 257.
C. Menger (2011) Principles of Economics (Terra Libertas), p. 16.
E. Bohm-Bawerk (1959) Capital and Interest (Libertarian Press); see Section XII in Book 1 on Exploitation Theory.
M. Woodford (2003) Interest and Prices: Foundations of a Theory of Monetary Policy (Princeton University Press).
G. Selgin (1995) ‘The “Productivity Norm” versus Zero Inflation in the History of Economic Thought’, History of Political Economy, Vol. 27, No. 4, p. 713, Table 1.
L. Von Mises (1981) Theory of Money and Credit (Liberty Fund), p. 164.
A. Tebble (2010) Major Conservative and Libertarian Thinkers — Friedrich Hayek (Continuum International Publishing), p. 6.
F. Hayek (1946) Prices and Production (George Routledge & Sons), p. 4.
F. Hayek (1966) Monetary Theory and the Trade Cycle (Augustus M. Kelley), p. 123.
F. Hayek (1939) Profits, Interest and Investment (George Routledge & Sons), p. 84.
R. Garrison (2001) Time and Money (Routledge)
M. Rothbard (2001) Man, Economy and State (Ludwig Von Mises Institute).
T. Cowen (1997) Risk and Business Cycles (Routledge), p. 29.
H.M. Trautwein (1994) ‘Hayek’s Double Failure in Business Cycle Theory’, in M. Colonna and H. Hagemann (eds) Money and Business Cycles: The Economics of FA Hayek (Elgar Publishing), pp. 79–80.
M. Desai (1995) ‘Task of Monetary Theory’, in Macroeconomics and Monetary Theory: The Selected Essays of Meghnad Desai (Elgar), p. 163.
C. Ruhl (1994) ‘The Transformation of Business Cycle Theory: Hayek, Lucas and a Change in the Notion of Equilibrium’, p. 190 in Colonna and Hagemann (eds) Money.
G. Myrdal (1965) Monetary Equilibrium (Augustus M. Kelley), p. 16.
P. Sraffa (1932) ‘Dr. Hayek on Money and Capital’, Economic Journal, Vol. 42 (March), pp. 42–53.
D. Laidler (1991) ‘The Austrians and the Stockholm School: Two Failures?’, in L. Jonung (ed.) The Stockholm School of Economics Revisited (Cambridge University Press), p. 317.
B. Ohlin (1937) ‘Some Notes on the Stockholm Theory of Savings and Investments II’, The Economic Journal, Vol. 47, p. 233.
E. Lindahl (1970) Studies in the Theory of Money and Capital (Augustus M. Kelley), p. 146.
B. Ohlin (1937) ‘Some Notes on the Stockholm Theory of Savings and Investments F’, The Economic Journal, Vol. 47, p. 56.
A. Leijonhufvud (1979) ‘The Wicksell Connection’, www.econ.ucla.edu, pp. 44–45.
Copyright information
© 2013 Thomas Aubrey
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Aubrey, T. (2013). The Vienna and Stockholm schools: A dynamic disequilibrium approach. In: Profiting from Monetary Policy. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137289704_5
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137289704_5
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-67097-0
Online ISBN: 978-1-137-28970-4
eBook Packages: Palgrave Economics & Finance CollectionEconomics and Finance (R0)