Abstract
The previous chapter highlighted the contested nature of capital exchange in the paradise setting; that conflict over capital contributions and distributions essentially defined paradise operating in a rather ‘capitalistic’ way. This chapter looks in greater detail at underlying reasons why paradise interactions could escalate so easily into conflict. A key thesis is that the agents of paradise compare well with the model of the economic agent: homo economicus. This model invokes self-interest and utility ‘optimization’ in different shades and levels as the key driving force of behaviour (for a review, see Kirchgässner 2014). In this regard, the chapter examines how closely the agents of the Paradise story (God, Adam and Eve, and the serpent) compare with a model of self-interested, utility-focused choice, and possibly worse, to what Buchanan (1975) called outright predation, or Williamson (1975, 1985), slightly more mildly, termed opportunism and subtle self-seeking with guile.
Now the serpent was more crafty than any of the wild animals the LORD God had made.
(Genesis 3: 1)
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© 2015 Sigmund Wagner-Tsukamoto
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Wagner-Tsukamoto, S.A. (2015). Agents of Paradise and the Rise of Self-interest. In: The Economics of Paradise. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137287700_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137287700_5
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-67091-8
Online ISBN: 978-1-137-28770-0
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